PA Bill Number: HB2663
Title: Providing for older adults protective services; and making a repeal.
Description: Providing for older adults protective services; and making a repeal. ...
Last Action: Referred to AGING AND OLDER ADULT SERVICES
Last Action Date: Nov 19, 2024
MONUMENTAL DECISION - Federal Court Rules It's Unconstitutional to Strip Second Amendment Rights as a Result of a Second DUI :: 10/01/2018
Today, Chief Counsel Joshua Prince and attorney Adam Kraut secured a major victory for Second Amendment jurisprudence in Holloway v. Sessions, et al., 1:17-CV-00081, where Chief Judge Christopher Connor of the Middle District of Pennsylvania ruled in a 21 page memorandum that it was unconstitutional as-applied to Mr. Holloway to preclude him in perpetuity from exercising his Second Amendment rights as a result of a 2005 DUI.
Specifically, after finding that DUI is a non-violent offense and calling the Defendants out in footnote 7 for their erroneous contention that “[f]orty-six states punish DUIs as felonies on a first or subsequent conviction,” the Court found that “[t]he government has not shown consensus regarding the seriousness of a generic second DUI offense, let alone a second DUI offense at a high rate of alcohol.” Thereafter, the Court went on to hold that “[a]fter a careful weighing of the Binderup factors, the court concludes that Holloway’s crime was not a ‘serious offense’ within the ambit of Section 922(g)(1).”
In turning to the second prong of Binderup, the Court held
The government has not satisfied its burden of proving that disarmament of Holloway, and other individuals like him, will promote public safety. It relies heavily on an expert report to support the proposition that individuals like Holloway “are substantially more likely to intentionally use firearms to harm others, inflict self-harm, and cause inadvertent harm. The expert report states that individuals with alcohol dependency or abuse are more prone to violence and cites one study that suggests just over 50 percent of DUI offenders were alcohol dependent. (Doc. 61-4 at 4-5 & n.8). It further notes that alcohol abuse is often comorbid with mental illness and is strongly linked with domestic violence, youth violence, violent crime, and road rage. (Id. at 6-7). But nothing in the record suggests that Holloway was ever diagnosed with or suffered from alcohol dependence, alcohol abuse, or mental illness. Moreover, the report acknowledges that “it is not possible to determine with certainty whether these associations are causal.” (Id. at 6).
The Court then goes on to hold that “[t]he government has not demonstrated a substantial fit between Holloway’s continued disarmament and the important government interest of preventing armed mayhem.”
As such, the Court concludes:
Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Holloway. Holloway’s disqualifying conviction was not sufficiently serious to warrant deprivation of his Second Amendment rights, and disarmament of individuals such as Holloway is not sufficiently tailored to further the government’s compelling interest of preventing armed mayhem. The court will grant summary judgment, declaratory judgment, and permanent injunctive relief to Holloway.
The accompanying Order declares:
AND NOW, this 28th day of September, 2018, upon consideration of the plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 58) for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and defendants’ motion (Doc. 60) to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 58) for summary judgment is GRANTED.
2. Defendants’ motion (Doc. 60) to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment is DENIED.
3. It is ORDERED and DECLARED that the felon-in-possession ban of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff Raymond Holloway, Jr. (“Holloway”) in violation of the Second Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Defendants, together with all those acting in concert with them, are ENJOINED from enforcing, directing enforcement, or permitting enforcement of the felon-in-possession ban of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against Holloway.
4. The Clerk of Court shall enter declaratory judgment in Holloway’s favor on his Second Amendment claim, brought pursuant to Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336, 339 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017), challenging the felon-in-possession ban of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as applied to him, said judgment to be entered in accordance with paragraph 3.
5. The Clerk of Court shall thereafter close this case.
If your constitutional rights have been denied by the U.S. Government, contact Firearms Industry Consulting Group today to discuss YOUR rights and legal options.
Firearms Industry Consulting Group® (FICG®) is a registered trademark and division of Civil Rights Defense Firm, P.C., with rights and permissions granted to Prince Law Offices, P.C. to use in this article.
