

119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 7178

To amend the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, to make improvements relating to cooperation between the United States and Israel to counter unmanned systems across warfighting domains, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 21, 2026

Mr. GOTTHEIMER (for himself, Mr. GARBARINO, Mr. LIEU, Mr. BACON, Mr. VALADAO, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. DAVIS of North Carolina, Mr. CISCOMANI, Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Mr. MOSKOWITZ, Mr. SUOZZI, Mr. JOYCE of Ohio, and Mr. LaLOTA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To amend the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, to make improvements relating to cooperation between the United States and Israel to counter unmanned systems across warfighting domains, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “U.S.-Israel Anti-Killer
3 Drone Act of 2026”.

4 **SEC. 2. IMPROVEMENTS RELATING TO UNITED STATES-**
5 **ISRAEL COOPERATION TO COUNTER UN-**
6 **MANNED SYSTEMS.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

8 (1) The growing arsenal of unmanned systems
9 of Iran includes—

10 (A) unmanned systems that engage in in-
11 telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and

12 (B) armed unmanned systems capable of
13 striking battlefield targets, including loitering
14 munitions, also known as “suicide drones” or
15 “one-way attack drones”.

16 (2) Iran-origin unmanned systems represent a
17 threat to the Armed Forces and facilities of the
18 United States in the Middle East, as well as to
19 United States allies and partners such as Israel,
20 Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

21 (3) In February 2018, Iran allegedly launched
22 an armed unmanned aerial vehicle from Syria into
23 Israeli airspace which was ultimately destroyed by
24 Israeli warplanes.

1 (4) In September 2019, Iran launched cruise
2 missiles and loitering munitions at key oil installa-
3 tions in Saudi Arabia.

4 (5) Throughout the takeover of Yemen by the
5 Houthi, beginning in 2014 and continuing into the
6 present, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
7 Quds-Force, the al-Ghadir Missile Command of the
8 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace
9 Force, and the Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad
10 organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
11 Corps has supported the capabilities of Yemeni
12 rebels, including through the provision of unmanned
13 systems and other relevant technology, such as
14 cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Such support
15 enables the Houthis to routinely strike civilian tar-
16 gets in both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
17 Emirates.

18 (6) In January 2021, Iran-backed Shiite militia
19 groups in Iraq launched armed unmanned aerial ve-
20 hicles at Saudi Arabia.

21 (7) In March 2021, Iran attempted to send two
22 delta-wing unmanned aerial vehicles toward Israel
23 which were ultimately downed by Israeli warplanes
24 over the territory of an undisclosed Arab country.

1 (8) In July 2021, Iran launched an attack em-
2 ploying unmanned aerial vehicles, including loitering
3 munitions against a Liberian-flagged, Israeli-oper-
4 ated tanker, “M/T Mercer Street”, near the coast of
5 Oman that killed two people, a British and a Roma-
6 nian national.

7 (9) On November 1, 2021, the Secretary of De-
8 fense and the Defense Minister of Israel signed a
9 memorandum of understanding establishing the
10 United States-Israel Operations Technology-Working
11 Group, which includes six sub-working groups, in-
12 cluding sub-working groups focused on countering
13 unmanned systems and directed energy capabilities.

14 (10) On March 27 and 28, 2022, Secretary of
15 State Blinken met in Israel with counterparts from
16 the governments of Israel, Bahrain, Egypt, the
17 United Arab Emirates, and Morocco to promote nor-
18 malization in the region and declared, “Our commit-
19 ment to the core principle that Iran can never ac-
20 quire a nuclear weapon is unwavering. One way or
21 another, we will continue to cooperate closely.”.

22 (11) In May 2022, Iran inaugurated an un-
23 manned system factory in Tajikistan to manufacture
24 and export the Ababil-2, a multipurpose unmanned

1 system with reconnaissance, combat, and suicide ca-
2 pabilities.

3 (12) On June 2, 2022, Iran-backed Hezbollah
4 sent three unmanned aerial vehicles toward the
5 Israeli-controlled Karish gas field, one of which was
6 intercepted by an F-16 fighter jet, and two of which
7 were intercepted by Barak 8 missiles launched from
8 the Sa'ar 5-class corvette "INS Eilat".

9 (13) On July 2, 2022, the Israeli military re-
10 portedly shot down three unmanned aerial vehicles
11 launched by Hezbollah in the vicinity of where an
12 Israeli gas platform had been recently installed in
13 the Mediterranean Sea.

14 (14) On July 14, 2022, the United States and
15 Israel adopted the Joint Declaration on the U.S.-
16 Israel Strategic Partnership, reaffirming the un-
17 breakable bonds between the two countries and the
18 enduring commitment of the United States to the
19 security of Israel.

20 (15) In late August 2022, Iran reportedly sent
21 its first batch of Shahed-136 unmanned systems to
22 Russia for use against Ukraine. While Russia is re-
23 branding these systems the Geran-2, United States
24 officials revealed the agreement in the summer of
25 2022.

1 (16) On September 12, 2022, Brigadier Gen-
2 eral Kioumars Heydari, who heads the ground forces
3 of the Armed Forces of Iran, announced that the
4 Armed Forces of Iran had developed the Arash-2
5 unmanned system specifically designed to attack Tel
6 Aviv and Haifa.

7 (17) On November 13, 2022, and on February
8 10, 2023, Iran-origin unmanned systems allegedly
9 targeted Israeli-owned oil tankers off the coast of
10 Oman.

11 (18) Since 2022, Russia has used Iran-origin
12 Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with en-
13 hanced navigation systems to evade Ukrainian air
14 defenses, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties.

15 (19) On February 14, 2023, United States
16 forces in Syria reportedly shot down an Iran-origin
17 unmanned aerial vehicle surveilling United States
18 positions around oil facilities.

19 (20) On October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorists
20 launched a brutal, unprovoked attack from Gaza
21 into Israel, killing more than 1,200 people, including
22 at least 30 Americans, according to the Israeli mili-
23 tary and the Department of State. The attack in-
24 volved a significant number of unmanned systems.

1 (21) Between late 2023 and 2024, United
2 States forces in Iraq and Syria were repeatedly tar-
3 geted by Iran-backed militias using armed un-
4 manned systems, resulting in American casualties.

5 (22) In June 2025, Iran launched a series of
6 unmanned system attacks against targets in Israel,
7 including both military installations and critical in-
8 frastructure. The scale and coordination of the at-
9 tack demonstrated the expanding operational capa-
10 bilities of Iran.

11 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
12 gress that the United States should—

13 (1) enhance ongoing cooperation with Israel in
14 researching, developing, and fielding, as expedi-
15 tiously as possible, mutually beneficial technologies
16 and capabilities to counter unmanned systems, for
17 the purpose of addressing common military require-
18 ments and growing threats;

19 (2) exchange with Israel information about the
20 evolving threat of Iran-origin unmanned systems;

21 (3) conduct joint training exercises and develop
22 information-sharing mechanisms to maximize the ex-
23 change of technical expertise, data, and tactics re-
24 lated to emerging unmanned systems and associated
25 threats;

1 (4) coordinate with acquisition program offices
2 of the United States Armed Forces and Israeli mili-
3 tary service departments, components, and com-
4 mands to expedite the deployment of relevant sys-
5 tems and enhance military readiness; and

6 (5) use the United States-Israel Operations-
7 Technology Working Group established pursuant to
8 section 1299M(c) of the National Defense Author-
9 ization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–
10 283; 134 Stat. 4014), or any successor working
11 group, as the epicenter of such efforts.

12 (c) REPORT ON UNITED STATES-ISRAEL COOPERA-
13 TION TO COUNTER UNMANNED SYSTEMS.—Section 1278
14 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
15 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1702; 22 U.S.C.
16 8606 note) is amended—

17 (1) in subsection (b)(4), by striking
18 “\$55,000,000” and inserting “\$100,000,000”;

19 (2) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as
20 subsections (f) and (g), respectively; and

21 (3) by inserting after subsection (d) the fol-
22 lowing new subsections:

23 “(e) ANNUAL REPORTS.—The Secretary of Defense
24 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
25 on an annual basis a report containing—

1 “(1) a description of the activities authorized in
2 subsection (a)(1) conducted during the preceding fis-
3 cal year, including—

4 “(A) an assessment of progress made by
5 the United States and Israel in addressing
6 threats and requirements relating to unmanned
7 systems (as such term is defined in section 319
8 of title 14, United States Code);

9 “(B) an assessment of the harmonization
10 of such activities authorized in subsection (a)(1)
11 with other programs of the United States Gov-
12 ernment or programs of contractors of the De-
13 partment of Defense;

14 “(C) an update on efforts to transition ca-
15 pabilities to acquisition program managers for
16 fielding by the United States Armed Forces or
17 Israeli military services, components, and com-
18 mands; and

19 “(D) recommendations for future activities
20 to be conducted under this section and associ-
21 ated funding; and

22 “(2) an assessment of the threat to the United
23 States and Israel posed by unmanned aerial systems
24 from Iran and associated proxies of Iran, including
25 an assessment of deployed or otherwise available

1 anti-unmanned aircraft capabilities of the United
2 States or Israel and the adequacy of such capabili-
3 ties to offset such threat.”.

4 (d) UNMANNED SYSTEM DEFINED.—In this section,
5 the term “unmanned system” has the meaning given that
6 term in section 319 of title 14, United States Code.

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