

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2913

To authorize support for Ukraine, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 14, 2025

Mr. MEEKS (for himself, Mr. HOYER, Mr. CONNOLLY, Mr. DOGGETT, and Mr. KEATING) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, Intelligence (Permanent Select), Ways and Means, Rules, the Judiciary, Financial Services, Armed Services, and the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To authorize support for Ukraine, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Ukraine Support Act”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I—DIPLOMACY AND SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE

- Sec. 101. Affirming support for Ukraine.
- Sec. 102. Reaffirming the importance of NATO.
- Sec. 103. Condemning the kidnapping of Ukrainian children.
- Sec. 104. Support for Ukraine under title II of the BUILD Act of 2018.
- Sec. 105. Vessel war risk insurance.
- Sec. 106. Insurance for Ukraine Initiative.
- Sec. 107. Codification of a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian Reconstruction.
- Sec. 108. Support for Radio Free Europe.
- Sec. 109. Authorizing programs to counter and combat Russian disinformation activities.
- Sec. 110. Establishment of Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund.
- Sec. 111. United States-European Nuclear Energy Cooperation.

TITLE II—SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- Sec. 201. Lend-lease authority.
- Sec. 202. Direct loans and foreign military financing.
- Sec. 203. Support for Baltic countries.
- Sec. 204. Extension of Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.
- Sec. 205. Report on allied and partner military contributions.
- Sec. 206. Report on United States-Ukraine intelligence support and cooperation.

TITLE III—SANCTIONS AND EXPORT CONTROLS

- Sec. 301. Sanctions trigger determination.
- Sec. 302. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian financial institutions.
- Sec. 303. Impositions of sanctions with respect to Russian oil and mining industry.
- Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons affiliated with or supporting the Government of the Russian Federation.
- Sec. 305. Crimea tunnel sanctions.
- Sec. 306. Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant sanctions.
- Sec. 307. Rosatom sanctions.
- Sec. 308. Imposition of price cap vessel sanctions.
- Sec. 309. SWIFT sanctions.
- Sec. 310. Russian sovereign debt sanctions.
- Sec. 311. Imposition of sanctions on Russia-North Korea cooperation.
- Sec. 312. Sanctions for kidnapping Ukrainian children.
- Sec. 313. Imposition of dual-use export controls.
- Sec. 314. Duties on the Russian Federation.
- Sec. 315. Ending Russian oil import loophole.
- Sec. 316. Taxing capital gains on Russian sovereign assets.
- Sec. 317. Sanctions described.
- Sec. 318. Implementation; regulations; penalties.
- Sec. 319. Exceptions; waiver.
- Sec. 320. Termination.
- Sec. 321. Congressional review of Russia sanctions.
- Sec. 322. Definitions.

TITLE I—DIPLOMACY AND SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE

SEC. 101. AFFIRMING SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked and brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine, violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, subjecting the nation to acts of aggression that have threatened its independence and security.

(2) For three years, the people of Ukraine have demonstrated extraordinary resilience, courage, and determination in the face of relentless attacks on their homes, communities, sovereignty, and fundamental freedoms.

(3) Since the beginning of the invasion, Russia has engaged in widespread and systematic war crimes, including—

(A) deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, including residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and evacuation corridors;

(B) the forced deportation and kidnapping of at least 19,000 Ukrainian children to Russian-controlled territories in an attempt to erase Ukrainian identity;

1 (C) the destruction of Ukraine's agricul-
2 tural and energy infrastructure to create hu-
3 manitarian crises and disrupt global food sup-
4 ply chains; and

5 (D) the use of torture, extrajudicial
6 killings, and mass graves in occupied Ukrainian
7 territories, as documented by the United Na-
8 tions, the International Criminal Court, and
9 leading human rights organizations.

10 (4) Despite these atrocities, the people of
11 Ukraine remain unyielding, demonstrating that their
12 spirit and commitment to self-determination cannot
13 be extinguished.

14 (5) The Russian Federation, despite its over-
15 whelming use of force, has suffered catastrophic
16 military losses, with estimates exceeding 800,000
17 casualties, illustrating that President Vladimir
18 Putin's war of conquest has become both a strategic
19 failure and a humanitarian disaster for Russia.

20 (6) Ukraine, despite facing an adversary with a
21 far larger population, army, and military arsenal,
22 continues to fight courageously for its sovereignty,
23 demonstrating its resilience and determination.

24 (7) Russia's war has destabilized global secu-
25 rity, undermining the principles of sovereignty and

1 nonaggression and emboldening authoritarian re-
2 gimes seeking to redraw international borders by
3 force.

4 (8) The United States, the North Atlantic
5 Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union,
6 and allied nations have demonstrated historic unity
7 in their support for Ukraine, reaffirming their com-
8 mitment to upholding international law, territorial
9 integrity, and democratic values.

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that the United States—

12 (1) recognizes that discussions surrounding the
13 future of Ukraine must include Ukraine;

14 (2) condemns in the strongest possible terms
15 the Russian Federation’s ongoing war crimes, its
16 targeted destruction of Ukrainian society, and its
17 blatant violations of international law;

18 (3) reaffirms its commitment to the people of
19 Ukraine and the principles of sovereignty, independ-
20 ence, and territorial integrity within internationally
21 recognized borders;

22 (4) urges the immediate and unconditional
23 withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukrainian ter-
24 ritory, including Crimea and the Donbas, and af-
25 firms that any negotiations must be based on

1 Ukraine's sovereignty, not dictated by Russian ulti-
2 matums;

3 (5) demands international institutions take de-
4 cisive action to ensure the safe return of at least
5 19,000 kidnapped Ukrainian children, recognizing
6 that their forced deportation is a war crime and an
7 act of genocide under international law;

8 (6) supports the continued prosecution of Vladi-
9 mir Putin and Russian political and military leaders
10 for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and geno-
11 cide, reinforcing that those who orchestrate such
12 atrocities must be held accountable before the world;
13 and

14 (7) stresses that any sustainable peace deal
15 must be built with Ukraine and our European allies
16 at the table.

17 **SEC. 102. REAFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO.**

18 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

19 (1) The United States and its democratic allies
20 and partners face unprecedented international chal-
21 lenges and evolving threats to global security.

22 (2) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
23 (NATO) was founded on April 4, 1949, to counter
24 Soviet expansion, prevent further world wars in Eu-
25 rope, and strengthen transatlantic security, and is

1 built on the democratic principles of freedom, secu-
2 rity, and national sovereignty.

3 (3) Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty un-
4 derpins the principle of “collective defense” and has
5 served as a guiding value of United States foreign
6 policy for over 75 years.

7 (4) The United States commitment to Article 5
8 enhances deterrence against adversaries such as
9 Russia, China, and Iran that seek to spread their
10 malign influence.

11 (5) The unity of NATO allies strengthens col-
12 lective security and the stability of democratic
13 states.

14 (6) NATO serves as a bulwark against the pro-
15 liferation of malign influence, technologies, and de-
16 stabilizing operations by adversaries.

17 (7) Authoritarian regimes such as Russia,
18 China, Iran, and North Korea have increased col-
19 laboration in political, economic, and security sectors
20 to undermine democratic principles.

21 (8) In the only invocation of Article 5, NATO
22 allies provided military and intelligence support to
23 the United States following the September 11, 2001,
24 attacks, and many NATO allies incurred significant
25 casualties in Afghanistan.

1 (9) NATO has remained steadfast in its sup-
2 port for Ukraine, with member countries providing
3 military and non-security assistance, strengthening
4 Ukraine's defense capabilities, and imposing costs on
5 Russia for its illegal invasion.

6 (10) Finland and Sweden made the sovereign
7 decision to accede to NATO following Russia's inva-
8 sion of Ukraine.

9 (11) NATO continues to address systemic chal-
10 lenges posed by China to Euro-Atlantic interests and
11 security.

12 (12) NATO member states have strengthened
13 their defense and cyber capabilities, including
14 through the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the
15 North Atlantic (DIANA) program.

16 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
17 gress that—

18 (1) the United States reaffirms its full and un-
19 wavering commitment to NATO;

20 (2) NATO remains vital to United States na-
21 tional security interests and the United States re-
22 mains fully committed to defending its allies under
23 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

24 (3) NATO's open door policy is essential to Eu-
25 ropean security, and every sovereign state has the

1 right to determine its security arrangements, includ-
2 ing Ukraine;

3 (4) the United States remembers and honors
4 the thousands of NATO coalition soldiers who sac-
5 rificed their lives following the invocation of Article
6 5 after the September 11, 2001, attacks;

7 (5) all NATO allies should dedicate at least 2
8 percent of their gross domestic product to national
9 defense or establish concrete plans to meet their 2
10 percent obligations by the Washington Summit; and

11 (6) NATO allies must continue cooperation in
12 advanced defense technologies, counterintelligence,
13 and cybersecurity programs to counter evolving
14 threats from adversaries such as Russia, China, and
15 Iran.

16 **SEC. 103. CONDEMNING THE KIDNAPPING OF UKRAINIAN**
17 **CHILDREN.**

18 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

19 (1) On January 12, 1951, the Convention on
20 the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
21 Genocide (commonly known as the “Genocide Con-
22 vention”) entered into force. The Russian Federa-
23 tion is a party to the Convention and is therefore
24 bound by its obligations.

1 (2) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federa-
2 tion escalated its 8-year occupation of sovereign
3 Ukrainian territory by launching a full-scale,
4 unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

5 (3) Russian armed forces have committed wide-
6 spread and systematic atrocities against Ukrainian
7 civilians, including the targeting of civilian infra-
8 structure and protected sites.

9 (4) On March 9, 2022, Russian forces attacked
10 a maternity hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine, resulting
11 in the deaths of 5 individuals and injuries to 17 oth-
12 ers, in violation of international humanitarian law.

13 (5) On March 22, 2022, the Ukrainian Ministry
14 of Foreign Affairs announced that the Russian mili-
15 tary had illegally abducted and forcibly transferred
16 2,389 Ukrainian children from temporarily occupied
17 areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

18 (6) On June 2, 2022, Ukrainian President
19 Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that an estimated
20 200,000 Ukrainian children had been forcibly trans-
21 ferred to Russia.

22 (7) Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention de-
23 fines “forcibly transferring children of the group to
24 another group” as an act of genocide.

1 (8) Maria Lvova-Belova, Children’s Rights
2 Commissioner for the President of Russia, publicly
3 admitted to overseeing the abduction and forced
4 transfer of Ukrainian children and their adoption by
5 Russian families.

6 (9) Ukrainian authorities have stated that
7 many abducted children have living family members
8 in Ukraine but have been separated due to Russia’s
9 renewed invasion.

10 (10) On June 16, 2022, Russian authorities an-
11 nounced that children born in occupied Ukrainian
12 territories after the February 24, 2022, invasion
13 would automatically be deemed Russian citizens,
14 contributing to the erasure of Ukrainian identity.

15 (11) On June 22, 2022, the United Nations
16 Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner
17 verified that at least 320 children had been killed as
18 a result of Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine.

19 (12) On July 11, 2022, United Nations Sec-
20 retary-General António Guterres ordered an inves-
21 tigation into the deaths and injuries of Ukrainian
22 children in the context of the conflict.

23 (13) On July 13, 2022, Secretary of State
24 Antony J. Blinken called on the Russian Federation
25 to “immediately halt its systemic filtration oper-

1 ations in Ukraine”, which have resulted in the dis-
2 appearance, detention, or forcible deportation of be-
3 tween 900,000 and 1,600,000 Ukrainians, including
4 approximately 260,000 children.

5 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that—

7 (1) the abduction and forcible transfer of chil-
8 dren and facilitation of illegal adoptions of Ukrain-
9 ian children by the Russian Federation is contrary
10 to Russia’s obligations under the Genocide Conven-
11 tion and constitute acts of genocide;

12 (2) the Russian Federation is deliberately seek-
13 ing to wipe out a generation of Ukrainian children,
14 thereby crippling Ukraine’s ability to nurture the
15 next generation of Ukrainian citizens and leaders
16 and to rebuild their country after Russia’s
17 unprovoked war, with the purpose of demolishing
18 Ukraine’s unique language, culture, history, and
19 identity;

20 (3) the Russian Federation’s unprovoked inva-
21 sion of Ukraine has significantly increased the risks
22 of children being exposed to human trafficking and
23 exploitation, child labor, gender-based violence, hun-
24 ger, injury, trauma, deprivation of education and
25 shelter, and death; and

1 (4) the Government of the Russian Federation,
2 under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, bears full
3 responsibility for the wrongful and illegal abduction
4 and forcible transfer of children from Ukraine, and
5 Congress condemns these actions in the strongest
6 terms.

7 **SEC. 104. SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE UNDER TITLE II OF THE**
8 **BUILD ACT OF 2018.**

9 Section 1412(c) of the Better Utilization of Invest-
10 ments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C.
11 9612(c)) is amended—

12 (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting “in Ukraine
13 and” after “the provision of support under title II”;
14 and

15 (2) in paragraph (2)—

16 (A) by striking “The Corporation” and in-
17 serting the following:

18 “(A) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation”;

19 (B) by striking “(A) the President” and
20 inserting the following:

21 “(i) the President”;

22 (C) by striking “(B) such support” and in-
23 serting the following:

24 “(ii) such support”; and

25 (D) by adding at the end the following:

1 “(B) NON-APPLICABILITY TO UKRAINE.—

2 The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not
3 apply with respect to Ukraine.”.

4 **SEC. 105. VESSEL WAR RISK INSURANCE.**

5 (a) ELIGIBILITY.—Notwithstanding section 53902 of
6 title 46, United States Code, for the period beginning on
7 the date of enactment of this Act, and ending 5 years after
8 such date, a covered vessel shall be deemed to be eligible
9 for insurance or reinsurance under chapter 539 of title
10 46, United States Code, if such vessel is engaged in trans-
11 portation in waterborne commerce importing cargo to, or
12 exporting cargo from, Ukraine.

13 (b) EXPANSION OF CARGO.—Subparagraphs (B)
14 through (D) of section 53903(a)(3) of title 46, United
15 States Code, shall not apply to cargo imported or exported
16 to or from Ukraine.

17 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

18 (1) COVERED VESSEL.—The term “covered ves-
19 sel” means a vessel that is owned by a citizen of—

20 (A) a member country of the North Atlan-
21 tic Treaty Organization;

22 (B) Ukraine; or

23 (C) any other country the Secretary of
24 State, in consultation with the Secretary of
25 Transportation, determines, in the interest of

1 national security, shall be considered eligible for
2 insurance or reinsurance under chapter 539 of
3 title 46, United States Code.

4 (2) OWNED BY A CITIZEN.—The term “owned
5 by a citizen” means ownership by an entity that is
6 considered to be a citizen of a country in the same
7 manner as an entity is deemed to be a citizen of the
8 United States under section 50501 of title 46,
9 United States Code.

10 **SEC. 106. INSURANCE FOR UKRAINE INITIATIVE.**

11 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the
12 Department of State an entity to be known as the “Insur-
13 ance for Ukraine Initiative”.

14 (b) OBJECTIVES.—The objectives of the Insurance
15 for Ukraine Initiative are the following:

16 (1) Bolster confidence in Ukraine’s eventual
17 economic recovery from Russia’s full-scale invasion
18 through the provision of war risk insurance.

19 (2) Encourage European allies and partners to
20 finance and invest in Ukraine’s economic recovery,
21 including through the provision of war risk insur-
22 ance.

23 (3) Promote closer economic integration be-
24 tween Ukraine and other countries in Europe as well

1 as the United States and further Ukraine's acces-
2 sion to the European Union.

3 (4) Coordinate dialogue and fora for extensive
4 outreach with private sector insurance companies re-
5 lating to the provision of war risk insurance to
6 Ukraine.

7 (5) Work with Ukraine, international organiza-
8 tions, and Middle Eastern and African allies and
9 partners to ensure the bountiful and affordable ship-
10 ment of grain and other food commodities from
11 Ukraine.

12 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date
13 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
14 the following 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit
15 to the appropriate congressional committees a report that
16 includes assessments of—

17 (1) progress towards the achievement of each of
18 the objectives set forth in subsection (b); and

19 (2) legislative proposals that would further the
20 objectives set forth in subsection (b).

21 (d) DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT.—The
22 Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other
23 relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall seek to
24 provide diplomatic and political support to countries that
25 provide or provide support for war risk insurance for

1 Ukraine, including by using the diplomatic and political
2 influence and expertise of the Department of State to
3 build the capacity of such countries.

4 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
5 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
6 sional committees” means—

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
8 House of Representatives; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
10 Senate.

11 **SEC. 107. CODIFICATION OF A SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR**
12 **UKRAINIAN RECONSTRUCTION.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is established within the
14 Department of State a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian
15 Reconstruction.

16 (b) SELECTION.—The Special Coordinator shall be
17 chosen by the Secretary of State and shall report directly
18 to the Secretary.

19 (c) QUALIFICATIONS.—The Special Coordinator shall
20 be an individual with—

21 (1) private sector experience; and

22 (2) knowledge of Ukraine and foreign policy
23 pertaining thereto.

24 (d) DUTIES.—The Special Coordinator shall assist
25 in—

1 (1) harnessing the tools of different agencies of
2 the United States Government to promote the recon-
3 struction of Ukraine;

4 (2) coordinate cooperation amongst different
5 agencies and bureaus of the United States Govern-
6 ment to aid the recovery of Ukraine following its
7 war to protect its sovereignty; and

8 (3) work with the United States Development
9 Finance Corporation to mobilize private capital for
10 the reconstruction of Ukraine.

11 **SEC. 108. SUPPORT FOR RADIO FREE EUROPE.**

12 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
13 gress that—

14 (1) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty shall be
15 immediately restored to its full capacity and oper-
16 ational position prior to Executive order attempting
17 to shutter the agency;

18 (2) Radio Free Europe provides reliable, uncen-
19 sored, and accessible news and reporting in Ukraine
20 and other countries where media freedom is re-
21 stricted;

22 (3) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is one of
23 the most critical sources of unrestricted, independent
24 news and reporting for audiences on the periphery of
25 the Russian Federation;

1 (4) the Government of the Russian Federation
2 has engaged in systematic targeting of Radio Free
3 Europe/Radio Liberty reporters inside the Russian
4 Federation, which has negatively impacted the orga-
5 nization’s ability to provide timely, reliable, and ac-
6 curate news from inside the country; and

7 (5) despite pressure from the Government of
8 the Russian Federation, Radio Free Europe/Radio
9 Liberty’s audience continues to grow inside the Rus-
10 sian Federation and surrounding countries.

11 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
12 authorized to be appropriated \$250,000,000 for Radio
13 Free Europe/Radio Liberty for fiscal year 2026.

14 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF NEW BUREAUS.—Radio Free
15 Europe/Radio Liberty may explore opening new bureaus
16 to help expand its ability to reach audiences on the periph-
17 ery of the Russian Federation.

18 (d) INITIATIVES TO BOLSTER RADIO FREE EUROPE/
19 RADIO LIBERTY BUREAUS AROUND RUSSIAN FEDERA-
20 TION’S PERIPHERY.—To help expand its reach to Rus-
21 sian-speaking audiences and increase its reach to audi-
22 ences through digital media, Radio Free Europe/Radio
23 Liberty should—

24 (1) evaluate where Russian disinformation is
25 most deeply pervasive in the Eurasia region;

1 (2) develop strategies to better communicate
2 with predominately Russian-speaking regions;

3 (3) build on efforts to increase capacity and
4 programming to counter disinformation in real time;

5 (4) expand Russian language investigative jour-
6 nalism;

7 (5) improve the technical capacity of the
8 Ukraine bureau; and

9 (6) continue efforts to increase digital news
10 services.

11 (e) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days
12 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
13 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
14 a report that includes—

15 (1) recommendations of locations to open new
16 bureaus to help reach new audiences in the broader
17 Eurasia region;

18 (2) an assessment of current staffing and an-
19 ticipated staffing needs in order to effectively reach
20 audiences in the broader Eurasia region; and

21 (3) an assessment of the impact of the Govern-
22 ment of the Russian Federation closing down Radio
23 Free Europe/Radio Liberty within the Russian Fed-
24 eration.

1 (f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
2 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
3 sional committees” means—

4 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
5 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
6 resentatives; and

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
8 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

9 **SEC. 109. AUTHORIZING PROGRAMS TO COUNTER AND**
10 **COMBAT RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION ACTIVI-**
11 **TIES.**

12 (a) COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND.—The
13 Secretary of State should use funds available for obliga-
14 tion in the Countering Russian Influence Fund—

15 (1) to prioritize assisting Ukraine to detect and
16 combat disinformation from the Russian Federation
17 and its proxies; and

18 (2) to assist the Government of Ukraine in de-
19 veloping new defense strategies and technologies.

20 (b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after
22 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
23 of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign
24 Affairs of the House of Representatives and the
25 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a

1 plan for countering and combating disinformation by
2 the Russian Federation and supporting free and
3 independent media in Ukraine that includes—

4 (A) a plan to assist the Government of
5 Ukraine in combating and responding to malign
6 influence operations of the Russian Federation
7 aimed at inflaming tensions and dividing
8 Ukrainian society;

9 (B) an assessment of effective efforts and
10 programs to improve media literacy in Ukraine
11 and recommendations for how the United
12 States can assist in supporting and expanding
13 those programs;

14 (C) a plan to assist the Government of
15 Ukraine improve efforts to detect and remove
16 content originating from Russian troll farms,
17 bots, and other sources aimed at sowing divi-
18 sion and disseminating disinformation in
19 Ukraine or targeting Ukrainian audiences;

20 (D) recommendations to increase support
21 for independent media outlets, including Radio
22 Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and

23 (E) recommendations to increase support
24 for independent media outlets catering to Rus-
25 sian-speaking populations residing in Russian-

1 occupied Crimea, the Donbas region of Ukraine,
2 and throughout Ukraine.

3 (2) FORM.—The strategy required by para-
4 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
5 but may include a classified annex if necessary.

6 **SEC. 110. ESTABLISHMENT OF UKRAINE RECONSTRUCTION**
7 **TRUST FUND.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter A of chapter 98 of the
9 Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at
10 the end the following new section:

11 **“SEC. 9512. UKRAINE RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND.**

12 “(a) CREATION OF TRUST FUND.—There is estab-
13 lished in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund
14 to be known as the ‘Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund’,
15 consisting of such amounts as may be appropriated to
16 such fund as provided in this section.

17 “(b) TRANSFERS TO TRUST FUND.—There are here-
18 by appropriated to the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust
19 Fund amounts equivalent to the net revenues received in
20 the Treasury from the taxes imposed under section 892A.

21 “(c) EXPENDITURES FROM TRUST FUND.—Amounts
22 in the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund shall be avail-
23 able, as provided in appropriations Acts, only to the Sec-
24 retary of State for purposes of—

1 “(1) reconstruction and rebuilding efforts in
2 Ukraine,

3 “(2) humanitarian assistance to the people of
4 Ukraine,

5 “(3) fostering long-term economic growth and
6 private sector development in Ukraine, and

7 “(4) bolstering transparent and accountable
8 governance of the Ukrainian economy.

9 “(d) TRUST FUND NOT INTEREST-BEARING.—Sec-
10 tion 9602(b) shall not apply to the Ukraine Reconstruc-
11 tion Trust Fund.

12 “(e) REQUIREMENTS UNDER FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
13 ACT OF 1961.—Any assistance made available from
14 amounts in the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund shall
15 be subject to all applicable requirements for the provision
16 of such assistance for the same or similar purpose author-
17 ized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
18 2151 et seq.), including requirements under such Act re-
19 lating to administrative authorities, congressional notifica-
20 tions, and reporting.”.

21 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections
22 for subchapter A of chapter 98 of such Code is amended
23 by adding at the end the following new item:

 “Sec. 9512. Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund.”.

24 (c) REPORT.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
3 thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary of State shall
4 submit to the appropriate congressional committees
5 a report detailing the use of any funds made avail-
6 able from the Ukrainian Reconstruction Trust Fund.

7 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
8 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
9 propriate congressional committees” means—

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
11 Committee on Ways and Means, and the Com-
12 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
13 resentatives; and

14 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
15 the Committee on Finance, and the Committee
16 on Appropriations of the Senate.

17 **SEC. 111. UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN NUCLEAR ENERGY**
18 **COOPERATION.**

19 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

20 (1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federa-
21 tion initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which
22 has severely threatened energy security in the
23 United States, Europe, and around the world.

24 (2) The security of Ukraine’s energy grid has
25 been vital to Ukraine’s success in its defense of its

1 territory and ensuring the Ukrainian government
2 can effectively provide goods and services to Ukrain-
3 ian citizens.

4 (3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power
5 plants with 15 reactors, primarily Russian-designed
6 water-water energetic reactor (VVER) reactors.

7 (4) Russia, in its war of aggression against
8 Ukraine, has systematically targeted Ukraine's en-
9 ergy infrastructure through heavy shelling and tar-
10 geted attacks, particularly in the winter months
11 when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulner-
12 able.

13 (5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have ille-
14 gally occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Sta-
15 tion, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and
16 Russian forces have surrounded the station with
17 landmines, further threatening regional security.

18 (6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been
19 built across Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria,
20 the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary,
21 Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

22 (7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs
23 and fuel services to spread malign influence and
24 threaten United States and European energy secu-
25 rity.

1 (8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent
2 of the total uranium conversion infrastructure world-
3 wide and in 2020, had the largest uranium enrich-
4 ment capacity at close to 46 percent.

5 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
6 gress that—

7 (1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear
8 power industry, the Department of State should
9 prioritize the utilization of products and services
10 from the United States, and then prioritize products
11 and services from Europe and other allied or partner
12 countries, including Canada, Japan, the United
13 Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not di-
14 rectly competing with the United States;

15 (2) the United States and its allies must focus
16 on cooperation, including capacity building and
17 early-stage project support, to expand the nuclear
18 industry in Europe in a way that maintains non-
19 proliferation, security, and safety standards and
20 aligns with international obligations and treaties
21 while combating Russian and Chinese malign influ-
22 ence; and

23 (3) the United States should continue to pursue
24 the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use
25 of Small Modular Reactor Technology program as a

1 means of helping partner countries meet their clean
2 energy needs with scalable, flexible, secure, and safe
3 nuclear power programs.

4 (c) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State,
5 in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the
6 heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies,
7 shall develop a strategy to strengthen United States-Euro-
8 pean nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian ma-
9 lign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

10 (d) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection
11 (c) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:

12 (1) An overview and assessment of the Sec-
13 retary of State's efforts to broaden participation by
14 United States nuclear industry entities in Europe
15 and promote the accessibility and competitiveness of
16 United States, European, and partner technologies
17 and services against Russian and Chinese tech-
18 nologies in Europe.

19 (2) An overview of different nuclear reactor
20 types that are currently deployed or under regu-
21 latory review in Europe, including large light-water
22 reactors, small modular light-water reactors, and
23 non-light-water reactors, and—

24 (A) what role, if any, each reactor type
25 could have in reducing Russia's influence over

1 European energy supply by 2030, 2035, 2040,
2 2045, and 2050;

3 (B) challenges that each reactor type may
4 face with rapid deployment, including costs,
5 market barriers to first-of-a-kind designs, sup-
6 ply chain constraints, and regulatory require-
7 ments;

8 (C) the impacts of each reactor type on
9 maintaining strong nonproliferation standards,
10 including the minimization of weapons-usable
11 nuclear material; and

12 (D) opportunities for the use of United
13 States, European, and partner technologies and
14 services in the deployment or potential deploy-
15 ment of each reactor type.

16 (3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are
17 currently deployed or under consideration in Europe,
18 including use of low enriched uranium, including
19 high assay low enriched uranium, and spent fuel re-
20 processing, along with an analysis of the implica-
21 tions of each fuel cycle on—

22 (A) reducing and eliminating Russia's
23 market share in Europe for uranium, conver-
24 sion, enrichment, and reactor fuel between now
25 and 2030;

1 (B) achieving long-term energy security
2 free of Russian influence; and

3 (C) maintaining strong nonproliferation
4 standards, including the minimization of weap-
5 ons-usable material as well as high nuclear safe-
6 ty and security standards.

7 (4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and
8 fuel cycle infrastructure that the United States Gov-
9 ernment is currently funding the development of,
10 and—

11 (A) the potential, if any, that each of these
12 technologies have to decrease or eliminate Rus-
13 sia's market share in the United States and
14 Europe for nuclear power reactors, uranium
15 mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel
16 fabrication, deconversion, and spent nuclear
17 fuel reprocessing in the short-, medium-, and
18 long-term;

19 (B) the impact of these technologies on the
20 minimization of weapons-usable nuclear mate-
21 rial, including the use of highly enriched ura-
22 nium or plutonium fuels; and

23 (C) an assessment of the use cases for
24 each of these designs and fuel cycles.

1 (5) An overview of the United States Govern-
2 ment’s diplomatic engagements regarding the nu-
3 clear energy sector in Europe.

4 (6) A list of countries in Europe with active nu-
5 clear power programs, and—

6 (A) an analysis of each country’s nuclear
7 energy policy;

8 (B) an overview of existing areas of co-
9 operation with regards to nuclear energy be-
10 tween each country and—

11 (i) the United States;

12 (ii) other European and friendly coun-
13 tries; and

14 (iii) adversarial countries including
15 China and Russia;

16 (C) an overview of potential areas for fu-
17 ture cooperation between each country and the
18 United States with regards to nuclear energy;
19 and

20 (D) a summary of fuel types used in each
21 country’s nuclear power programs.

22 (7) An overview of Russian and Chinese influ-
23 ence in the European nuclear energy sector.

24 (8) An overview of how the United States Gov-
25 ernment is working with allies and partners to

1 counter Russian malign influence within the Euro-
2 pean energy sector to include steps taken to counter
3 Russian influence in the mining and milling, conver-
4 sion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as
5 well as in reactor construction.

6 (9) An overview of how the United States Gov-
7 ernment balances the urgent strategic need for col-
8 laboration with allies and partners on countering
9 Russia's influence on nuclear energy in Europe, with
10 commercial competitiveness issues that may arise be-
11 tween United States companies and companies in
12 Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

13 (10) An assessment of Rosatom's role in Rus-
14 sia's energy sector, to include an overview of
15 strengths and vulnerabilities of the conglomerate.

16 (e) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after the
17 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
18 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
19 the strategy required by subsection (c).

20 (f) FORM.—The strategy required by subsection (c)
21 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
22 a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided sepa-
23 rately from the unclassified strategy.

24 (g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
25 authorized to be appropriated \$30,000,000 for each of fis-

1 cal years 2025 through 2029 to support critically needed
2 engagement in Europe consistent with the strategy re-
3 quired by subsection (c) on countering Russian malign in-
4 fluence and with a particular focus on responsible nuclear
5 power program capacity building, early stage nuclear
6 power project support, and countering Russian
7 disinformation campaigns.

8 (h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

9 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
10 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
11 mittees” means—

12 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
13 the House of Representatives;

14 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
15 the Senate;

16 (C) the Committee on Energy and Com-
17 merce of the House of the Representatives; and

18 (D) the Committee on Energy and Natural
19 Resources of the Senate.

20 (2) HIGH ASSAY LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—
21 The term “high assay low enriched uranium” means
22 uranium enriched so that the concentration of the
23 fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is between 5
24 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium.

1 (3) LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—The term “low
2 enriched uranium” means fuel in which the weight
3 percent of U-235 in the uranium is less than 20
4 percent.

5 **TITLE II—SECURITY**
6 **ASSISTANCE**

7 **SEC. 201. LEND-LEASE AUTHORITY.**

8 Section 2 of the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-
9 Lease Act of 2022 (Public Law 117–118; 136 Stat. 1184)
10 is amended—

11 (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking “fiscal
12 years 2022 and 2023” and inserting “fiscal years
13 2022 through 2028”;

14 (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as sub-
15 section (d); and

16 (3) by inserting after subsection (b) the fol-
17 lowing new subsection:

18 “(c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after any use
19 of the authority provided by subsection (a), the Secretary
20 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
21 shall submit to Congress a report that includes—

22 “(1) a description of the defense articles loaned
23 or leased to the Government of Ukraine, or to the
24 government of an Eastern European country im-

1 pacted by the Russian Federation’s invasion of
2 Ukraine, under such authority; and

3 “(2) a strategy and timeline for recovery and
4 return of such defense articles.”.

5 **SEC. 202. DIRECT LOANS AND FOREIGN MILITARY FINANC-**
6 **ING.**

7 (a) DIRECT LOANS.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Through fiscal year 2026,
9 direct loans under section 23 of the Arms Export
10 Control Act may be made available for Ukraine and
11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, notwith-
12 standing section 23(c)(1) of the Arms Export Con-
13 trol Act, gross obligations for the principal amounts
14 of which shall not exceed \$8,000,000,000.

15 (2) OTHER UNOBLIGATED BALANCES.—The un-
16 obligated balances of amounts made available by any
17 Act making appropriations for the Department of
18 State, foreign operations, and related programs,
19 under the heading “International Security Assist-
20 ance—Funds Appropriated to the President—For-
21 eign Military Financing” shall also be made avail-
22 able for the cost of loans and loan guarantees as au-
23 thorized by this section.

24 (b) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—The terms and condi-
25 tions described in section 2606 of the Ukraine Supple-

1 mental Appropriations Act of 2022 (division N of Public
 2 Law 117–103) shall apply to amounts made available by
 3 this section in the same manner and to the same extent
 4 as amounts made available by such section except that
 5 subsection (b) of such section shall be applied by striking
 6 “\$4,000,000,000” and inserting “\$8,000,000,000”.

7 (c) EMERGENCY DESIGNATION.—Amounts
 8 repurposed pursuant to this section that were previously
 9 designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement
 10 pursuant to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the
 11 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
 12 1985, are designated by the Congress as being for an
 13 emergency requirement pursuant to section
 14 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
 15 Deficit Control Act of 1985: *Provided*, That such amounts
 16 shall be available only if the President designates such
 17 amounts as an emergency requirement pursuant to section
 18 251(b)(2)(A)(i).

19 **SEC. 203. SUPPORT FOR BALTIC COUNTRIES.**

20 (a) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—The Secretary of
 21 State shall carry out programs, projects, and activities to
 22 build the capacity of the national militaries and border
 23 guard forces of Baltic countries, pursuant to the 2024 Bi-
 24 lateral Defense Cooperation Roadmaps for 2024–2028,
 25 which provide for the promotion of “defense cooperation

1 in integrated air and missile defense, maritime domain
2 awareness, cyber, irregular warfare, participation in inter-
3 national military operations and exercises, infrastructure
4 development, and training”.

5 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
6 authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State,
7 for each of the fiscal years 2026, 2027, and 2028, in addi-
8 tion to amounts already authorized to be appropriated for
9 such purposes to carry out the assistance described in sub-
10 section (a)—

11 (1) \$30,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing
12 grants authorized under section 23 of the Arms Ex-
13 port Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) for each Baltic
14 country; and

15 (2) \$4,000,000 for Nonproliferation, Anti-ter-
16 rorism, Demining, and Related programs, including
17 as authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act (22
18 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) for each Baltic country.

19 (c) BRIEFING.—Not later than 120 days after the
20 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
21 shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
22 ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
23 of Representatives regarding—

24 (1) the most pressing security needs of Baltic
25 countries;

1 (2) a plan for the disbursement of funds so ob-
2 ligated; and

3 (3) an analysis of European and other allied
4 country support for Baltic countries.

5 **SEC. 204. EXTENSION OF UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE**
6 **INITIATIVE.**

7 Section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization
8 Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat.
9 1068) is amended—

10 (1) in subsection (f), by adding at the end the
11 following:

12 “(11) For fiscal year 2026, \$300,000,000.

13 “(12) For fiscal year 2027, \$300,000,000.”;

14 and

15 (2) in subsection (h), by striking “December
16 31, 2026” and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

17 **SEC. 205. REPORT ON ALLIED AND PARTNER MILITARY**
18 **CONTRIBUTIONS.**

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
20 date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days there-
21 after, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Sec-
22 retary of Defense, shall submit to the Committee on For-
23 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-
24 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report in-
25 cluding—

1 (1) a detailed description of all military con-
2 tributions made or planned by allied and partner
3 countries, disaggregated by country, including de-
4 tails of types and quantities of platforms and sys-
5 tems provided;

6 (2) a description and analysis of military capa-
7 bilities identified as current Ukrainian operational
8 needs; and

9 (3) a description of United States efforts to
10 meet identified Ukrainian operational needs through
11 transfers of United States arms and military equip-
12 ment or through support and facilitation of allied
13 and partner transfer of arms and military equip-
14 ment.

15 (b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)
16 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
17 a classified annex that is submitted separately from the
18 unclassified portion.

19 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
20 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
21 sional committees” means—

22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
23 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
24 House of Representatives; and

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
2 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

3 **SEC. 206. REPORT ON UNITED STATES-UKRAINE INTEL-**
4 **LIGENCE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the
6 date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days there-
7 after, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination
8 with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, shall
9 submit to the appropriate congressional committees, a re-
10 port including—

11 (1) a detailed description of current United
12 States intelligence support and cooperation to and
13 with Ukrainian military and intelligence services;

14 (2) a description and analysis of the con-
15 sequences of ceasing such intelligence support and
16 cooperation to Ukraine, including as related to tar-
17 geting, battlefield effectiveness, early warning capa-
18 bilities, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity; and

19 (3) a description of United States efforts and
20 initiatives currently underway or planned to increase
21 Ukrainian intelligence, counterintelligence, and cy-
22 bersecurity capabilities.

23 (b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)
24 shall be submitted in classified form.

1 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
2 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
3 sional committees” means—

4 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
5 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
6 House of Representatives; and

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
8 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

9 **TITLE III—SANCTIONS AND**
10 **EXPORT CONTROLS**

11 **SEC. 301. SANCTIONS TRIGGER DETERMINATION.**

12 Not later than 15 days after the date of enactment
13 of this Act, and at minimum every 90 days thereafter, the
14 President shall make a determination as to whether the
15 Russian Federation or any proxy thereof, is engaged in—

16 (1) conducting a war of aggression against
17 Ukraine; or

18 (2) refusing to sincerely and actually negotiate
19 a peace agreement with Ukraine; or

20 (3) acting in violation of a negotiated peace
21 agreement with Ukraine.

22 **SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
23 **RUSSIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.**

24 (a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative
2 determination under section 301 and not later than
3 15 days following such a determination, the Presi-
4 dent shall impose the sanctions described in section
5 317 with respect to 3 or more of the following finan-
6 cial institutions:

7 (A) Sberbank.

8 (B) VTB.

9 (C) Gazprombank.

10 (D) VEB.RF.

11 (E) The Russian Direct Investment Fund.

12 (F) Credit Bank of Moscow.

13 (G) Alfa Bank.

14 (H) Rosselkhozbank.

15 (I) FC Bank Otkritie.

16 (J) Promsvyazbank.

17 (K) Sovcombank.

18 (L) Transkapitalbank.

19 (M) The Central Bank of the Russian Fed-
20 eration.

21 (2) SUBSIDIARIES AND SUCCESSOR ENTITIES.—
22 The President may impose the sanctions described
23 in section 310(a)(1) with respect to any subsidiary
24 of, or successor entity to, a financial institution
25 specified in paragraph (1).

1 (b) ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN FINANCIAL INSTITU-
2 TIONS.—

3 (1) LIST REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 days
4 after making an affirmative determination under
5 section 301, and every 90 days thereafter, the Presi-
6 dent shall submit to the appropriate committees of
7 Congress a list of foreign persons that the President
8 determines—

9 (A) are significant financial institutions
10 owned or operated by the Government of the
11 Russian Federation; and

12 (B) should be sanctioned in the interest of
13 United States national security.

14 (2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Upon the sub-
15 mission of each list required by paragraph (1), the
16 President shall impose the sanctions described in
17 section 310(a)(1) with respect to each foreign person
18 identified on the list.

19 **SEC. 303. IMPOSITIONS OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
20 **RUSSIAN OIL AND MINING INDUSTRY.**

21 Upon making an affirmative determination under
22 section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a
23 determination, the President shall impose the sanctions
24 described in section 317 with respect to all Russian com-
25 panies operating primarily in any of the following sectors:

1 (1) Oil and gas extraction, refinement, or pro-
2 duction.

3 (2) Coal extraction mining, refinement, or pro-
4 duction.

5 (3) Mineral extraction and processing.

6 **SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PER-**
7 **SONS AFFILIATED WITH OR SUPPORTING**
8 **THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FED-**
9 **ERATION.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
11 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
12 following such a determination, the President shall impose
13 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all
14 individuals listed under subsection (b) or included in the
15 additional lists under subsection (c).

16 (b) OFFICIALS SPECIFIED.—The officials specified in
17 this subsection are the following:

18 (1) The President of the Russian Federation.

19 (2) The Prime Minister of the Russian Federa-
20 tion.

21 (3) The Foreign Minister of the Russian Fed-
22 eration.

23 (4) The Minister of Defense of the Russian
24 Federation.

1 (5) The Minister of Transport of the Russian
2 Federation.

3 (6) The Minister of Energy of the Russian Fed-
4 eration.

5 (7) The Minister of Finance of the Russian
6 Federation.

7 (8) The Minister of Energy and Trade of the
8 Russian Federation.

9 (9) The Deputy Minister of Defense of the Rus-
10 sian Federation.

11 (10) The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Rus-
12 sian Federation.

13 (11) The Deputy Minister of Transport of the
14 Russian Federation.

15 (12) The Deputy Energy Minister of the Rus-
16 sian Federation.

17 (13) The Deputy Finance Minister of the Rus-
18 sian Federation.

19 (14) The Deputy Minister of Industry and
20 Trade of the Russian Federation.

21 (15) The Chief of the General Staff of the
22 Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

23 (16) The Commander-in-Chief of the Land
24 Forces of the Russian Federation.

1 (17) The Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace
2 Forces of the Russian Federation.

3 (18) The Commander of the Airborne Forces of
4 the Russian Federation.

5 (19) The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of
6 the Russian Federation.

7 (20) The Commander of the Strategic Rocket
8 Forces of the Russian Federation.

9 (21) The Commander of the Special Operations
10 Forces of the Russian Federation.

11 (22) The Commander of Logistical Support of
12 the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

13 (c) ADDITIONAL OFFICIALS.—

14 (1) LIST REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 days
15 after making an affirmative determination under
16 section 301 and every 90 days thereafter, the Presi-
17 dent shall submit to the appropriate committees of
18 Congress a list of foreign persons that the President
19 determines—

20 (A) are—

21 (i) senior officials of any branch of
22 the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa-
23 tion leading any of the operations de-
24 scribed in section 302; or

1 (ii) senior officials of the Government
2 of the Russian Federation, including any
3 intelligence agencies or security services of
4 the Russian Federation, with significant
5 roles in planning or implementing such op-
6 erations; and

7 (B) with respect to which sanctions should
8 be imposed in the interest of the national secu-
9 rity of the United States.

10 (2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Upon the sub-
11 mission of each list required by paragraph (1), the
12 President shall impose the sanctions described in
13 section 310 with respect to each foreign person on
14 the list.

15 **SEC. 305. CRIMEA TUNNEL SANCTIONS.**

16 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
17 ings:

18 (1) In February and March 2014, the Russian
19 Federation invaded the Crimean peninsula and an-
20 nexed Crimea, internationally recognized as Ukrain-
21 ian territory.

22 (2) Following its annexation of Crimea, the
23 Russian Federation constructed the Kerch Strait
24 Bridge to connect the Russian mainland with the
25 Crimean peninsula.

1 (3) On February 24, 2022, the Government of
2 the Russian Federation, led by Vladimir Putin,
3 launched an unprovoked, full-scale invasion of
4 Ukraine.

5 (4) The Russian Federation has used Crimea as
6 an integral part of its full scale invasion of Ukraine,
7 including to house Russian troops, store ammunition
8 and weapons, and host the Black Sea Fleet.

9 (5) In October 2023, it was publicly reported
10 that Russian and Chinese business officials met and
11 exchanged emails to discuss building a tunnel from
12 the Russian mainland to illegally occupied Crimea.

13 (b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Upon making an
14 affirmative determination under section 301 and not later
15 than 15 days following such a determination, the Presi-
16 dent shall impose the sanctions described in section 317
17 with respect to all foreign persons that knowingly partici-
18 pate in the construction, maintenance, or repair of a tun-
19 nel or bridge that connects the Russian mainland with the
20 Crimean peninsula.

21 **SEC. 306. ZAPORIZHZHIA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SANC-**
22 **TIONS.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
24 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
25 following such a determination, the President shall impose

1 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all
2 foreign persons that have endangered the integrity, safety,
3 or undermined Ukrainian operational control of the
4 Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station located in south-
5 eastern Ukraine since the Russian Federation launched an
6 unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

7 (b) EXCEPTION RELATED TO UKRAINIAN OPER-
8 ATIONAL CONTROL.—Sanctions under this section shall
9 not apply to any foreign person seeking to reestablish
10 Ukrainian operational control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear
11 Power Station or the surrounding region.

12 **SEC. 307. ROSATOM SANCTIONS.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
14 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
15 following such a determination, the President shall impose
16 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to—

17 (1) Rosatom;

18 (2) Rosatom subsidiaries; and

19 (3) a foreign person that knowingly directly or
20 indirectly engages in any significant transaction for
21 nuclear reactor construction and related services
22 with Rosatom.

23 (b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica-
24 tion of sanctions for a transaction or transactions with
25 a United States person, a foreign person, or a foreign fi-

1 nancial institution (as the case may be) described under
2 this section if—

3 (1) the President determines that the trans-
4 action relates to activities necessary to the produc-
5 tion of medical isotopes or industrial isotopes; and

6 (2) the President certifies to the appropriate
7 congressional committees that—

8 (A) domestic medical isotope or industrial
9 isotope production is insufficient to meet
10 United States patient and industry require-
11 ments; and

12 (B) the United States is taking measurable
13 steps to establish medical isotope or industrial
14 isotope supply chains that are not reliant on
15 Rosatom or other Russian source material.

16 **SEC. 308. IMPOSITION OF PRICE CAP VESSEL SANCTIONS.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
18 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
19 following such a determination, the President shall impose
20 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to any
21 foreign vessel that knowingly transports Russian oil in
22 contravention of the Russian oil price cap policy.

23 (b) EXCEPTION FOR SAFETY OF VESSELS AND
24 CREW.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply with
25 respect to a person providing provisions to a vessel other-

1 wise subject to sanctions under this section if such provi-
2 sions are intended for the safety and care of the crew
3 aboard the vessel, the protection of human life aboard the
4 vessel, or the maintenance of the vessel to avoid any envi-
5 ronmental or other significant damage.

6 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 60 days after the
7 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and
8 the Secretary of the Treasury shall jointly submit to the
9 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
10 tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
11 ate a strategy to enhance international compliance with
12 the Russian oil price cap policy.

13 (d) MATTERS.—The strategy under subsection (a)
14 shall include—

15 (1) an overview of general international compli-
16 ance with the Russian oil price cap policy;

17 (2) a list of the countries known to have pur-
18 chased significant quantities of Russian oil at prices
19 above the price agreed to in the Russian oil price
20 cap policy set forth by the Group of Seven (“G7”)
21 nations;

22 (3) any known methods used by such countries
23 to avoid detection of their purchases of Russian oil
24 at prices above the price agreed to in the Russian
25 oil price cap policy;

1 (4) an assessment of possible incentives the
2 United States could provide to countries listed pur-
3 suant to paragraph (2) to encourage compliance
4 with the Russian oil price cap policy;

5 (5) an assessment of whether the imposition of
6 additional sanctions, including possible secondary
7 sanctions, would enhance international compliance
8 with the Russian oil price cap policy;

9 (6) a description of the views of the government
10 of each country participating in the Russian oil price
11 cap policy regarding whether the price cap under
12 such policy should be lowered or not; and

13 (7) a description of the United States diplo-
14 matic engagement with the government of each
15 country participating in the Russian oil price cap
16 policy regarding the appropriateness of the current
17 cap, including any diplomatic engagement intended
18 to encourage support for the lowering of the price
19 cap.

20 **SEC. 309. SWIFT SANCTIONS.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
22 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
23 following such a determination, the President shall impose
24 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to any
25 global communication financial service that does not cease

1 the provision of financial communication messaging serv-
2 ices to any financial institution listed under section 302
3 of this Act.

4 (b) ENABLING OR FACILITATION OF ACCESS TO SPE-
5 CIALIZED FINANCIAL MESSAGING SERVICES THROUGH
6 INTERMEDIARY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—For purposes
7 of this section, enabling or facilitating direct or indirect
8 access to specialized financial messaging services includes
9 doing so by serving as an intermediary financial institu-
10 tion with access to such messaging services.

11 **SEC. 310. RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN DEBT SANCTIONS.**

12 Upon making an affirmative determination under
13 section 302 and not later than 30 days following such a
14 determination, the President shall prohibit all transactions
15 by United States persons involving the sovereign debt of
16 the Government of the Russian Federation issued on or
17 after the date of the enactment of this Act, including gov-
18 ernmental bonds.

19 **SEC. 311. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA-NORTH**
20 **KOREA COOPERATION.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
22 termination under section 301 and not later than 15 days
23 following such a determination, the President shall impose
24 the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to the
25 following:

1 (1) Any foreign person that is responsible for or
2 facilitates the transfer or sale of arms or material
3 support from North Korea to be used in Russia's il-
4 legal war in Ukraine.

5 (2) Any foreign person that knowingly, directly
6 or indirectly, imports, exports, or reexports to, into,
7 or from North Korea any goods services or tech-
8 nology for weapons that may be used by Russian
9 forces or their proxies in Russia's illegal war in
10 Ukraine.

11 (3) Any foreign financial institution that know-
12 ingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides
13 significant financial services for a foreign person de-
14 scribed in paragraph (1) or (2).

15 (4) Any foreign person that engages in a sig-
16 nificant transaction related to the transfer or sale of
17 arms or material support with a foreign person de-
18 scribed in paragraph (1) or (2) or foreign financial
19 institution described in paragraph (3).

20 (5) Any foreign person assisting in the logistical
21 supply and movement of North Korean personnel,
22 arms or material support to be used in Russia's ille-
23 gal war in Ukraine.

24 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
25 of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days there-

1 after, the President shall submit to the appropriate con-
2 gressional committees a report that describes significant
3 activities by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
4 to support the Russian Federation and its proxies in Rus-
5 sia’s illegal war in Ukraine.

6 (c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
7 quired by this section shall include the following:

8 (1) The number of North Korean troops that
9 have been sent to fight Ukraine, casualties inflicted
10 on these troops, and the impact on the battlefield of
11 having North Korean military personnel on the
12 frontlines.

13 (2) The identity and nationality of foreign per-
14 sons and foreign financial institutions that are sub-
15 ject to sanctions under section 317.

16 (3) A description of the conduct engaged in by
17 such persons and institutions.

18 (4) An assessment of the extent to which a for-
19 eign government has provided material support to
20 the Government of North Korea or any person act-
21 ing for or on behalf of that government to conduct
22 significant activities to materially support Russia’s
23 illegal war in Ukraine.

24 (5) A United States strategy to counter North
25 Korea’s efforts to conduct significant activities to

1 support Russia’s war in Ukraine, that includes ef-
2 forts to engage foreign governments to halt the ca-
3 pability of the Government of North Korea and per-
4 sons acting for or on behalf of that government to
5 conduct significant activities supporting Russia’s il-
6 legal war in Ukraine.

7 (d) FORM.—The report required by this section shall
8 be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a clas-
9 sified annex.

10 **SEC. 312. SANCTIONS FOR KIDNAPPING UKRAINIAN CHIL-**
11 **DREN.**

12 Upon making an affirmative determination under
13 section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a
14 determination, the President shall impose the sanctions
15 described in section 317 with respect to all foreign persons
16 that have directed or in anyway participated in the kid-
17 napping and wrongful patriation of Ukrainian children.

18 **SEC. 313. IMPOSITION OF DUAL-USE EXPORT CONTROLS.**

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon making an affirmative de-
20 termination under section 301, a foreign-produced item
21 shall be subject to the Export Administration Regulations
22 (pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50
23 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.)) if the item—

24 (1) meets—

1 (A) the product scope requirements de-
2 scribed in subsection (b); and

3 (B) the destination scope requirements de-
4 scribed in subsection (c); and

5 (2) is exported, reexported, or in-country trans-
6 ferred to the Russia Federation from abroad or in-
7 volves the Government of the Russian Federation.

8 (b) PRODUCT SCOPE REQUIREMENTS.—A foreign-
9 produced item meets the product scope requirements of
10 this subsection if the item—

11 (1) is a direct product of United States-origin
12 technology or software subject to the Export Admin-
13 istration Regulations that is specified in a covered
14 Export Control Classification Number; or

15 (2) is produced by any plant or major compo-
16 nent of a plant that is located outside the United
17 States, if the plant or major component of a plant,
18 whether made in the United States or a foreign
19 country, itself is a direct product of United States-
20 origin technology or software subject to the Export
21 Administration Regulations that is specified in a
22 covered Export Control Classification Number.

23 (c) DESTINATION SCOPE REQUIREMENTS.—A for-
24 eign-produced item meets the destination scope require-
25 ments of this subsection if there is knowledge that the for-

1 eign-produced item is destined to the Russian Federation
2 or will be incorporated into or used in the production or
3 development of any part, component, or equipment subject
4 to the Export Administration Regulations and produced
5 in or destined to the Russian Federation.

6 (d) LICENSING POLICY.—In carrying out this section,
7 the Secretary of Commerce shall apply a presumption that
8 an export, reexport, release, or in-country transfer of
9 items meets the product scope requirements set forth in
10 subsection (b) and the destination scope requirements set
11 forth in subsection (c).

12 (e) EXCEPTIONS.—The license requirements set forth
13 in this section shall not apply to—

14 (1) food, medicine, or medical devices that
15 are—

16 (A) designated as EAR99; or

17 (B) not designated under or listed on the
18 Commerce Control List; or

19 (2) services, software, or hardware (other than
20 services, software, or hardware for end-users owned
21 or controlled by the Government of Iran) that are—

22 (A) necessarily and ordinarily incident to
23 communications; or

24 (B) designated as—

25 (i) EAR99; or

1 (ii) Export Control Classification
2 Number 5A992.c or 5D992.c, and classi-
3 fied in accordance with section 740.17 of
4 title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; and
5 (C) subject to a general license issued by
6 the Department of Commerce or Department of
7 Treasury.

8 (f) DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE STRATEGY.—

9 (1) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than 60
10 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
11 Secretary of Commerce (in consultation with the
12 Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and
13 the Director of National Intelligence) shall develop a
14 strategy to prevent the illegal export to Iran by
15 United States persons regarding technologies used
16 or that may be used in the design, development, pro-
17 duction, or operational employment of unmanned
18 aircraft systems by Iran, including the following
19 microelectronics:

- 20 (A) Microcontrollers.
21 (B) Voltage regulators.
22 (C) Digital signal controllers.
23 (D) GPS modules.
24 (E) Microprocessors.

1 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy under paragraph
2 (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following ele-
3 ments:

4 (A) A process for the Secretary of Com-
5 merce (in coordination with the Secretaries and
6 heads specified in paragraph (1)) to proactively
7 identify—

8 (i) current and emerging technologies
9 used or that may be used by Iran in the
10 design, development, production, or oper-
11 ational employment of unmanned aircraft
12 systems (including critical components
13 thereof);

14 (ii) United States manufacturers of
15 such technologies; and

16 (iii) foreign manufacturers and
17 proliferators of such technologies.

18 (B) A process for the Secretary of Com-
19 merce (in coordination with the Secretaries and
20 heads specified in paragraph (1)) to proactively
21 identify third-party distributors and resellers of
22 the technologies specified in subparagraph
23 (A)(i) that, through the use of intermediaries
24 with no or nominal operations or assets, or
25 through other mechanisms, contrive to cir-

1 cumvent export controls for such items with re-
2 spect to Iran.

3 (C) A methodology for the Secretary of
4 Commerce to proactively engage the United
5 States manufacturers identified pursuant to the
6 process under subparagraph (A)(ii), to provide
7 such manufacturers with timely updates to the
8 list of third-party distributors and resellers
9 identified pursuant to the process under sub-
10 paragraph (B).

11 (3) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 60 days after
12 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
13 of Commerce shall submit to the appropriate con-
14 gressional committees the strategy under paragraph
15 (1).

16 (4) FORM.—The report required by subsection
17 (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
18 portions of the report described in paragraphs (1)
19 and (2) may contain a classified annex, so long as
20 such annex is provided separately from the unclassi-
21 fied report.

22 (g) DEPARTMENT OF STATE STRATEGY.—

23 (1) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of
24 State (in coordination with the Secretary of Com-
25 merce, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of

1 National Intelligence) shall develop a strategy to
2 prevent the export to Iran of technologies from the
3 United States and allied and partner countries
4 which are used, or may be used, by Iran in the de-
5 sign, development, production, or operational em-
6 ployment of unmanned aircraft systems (including
7 the microelectronics listed in subparagraphs (A)
8 through (F) of subsection (a)(1)).

9 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy under paragraph
10 (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following ele-
11 ments:

12 (A) A process for the Secretary of State
13 (in consultation with the relevant Secretaries
14 and heads specified in paragraph (1)) to
15 proactively identify foreign manufacturers of
16 the technologies referred to in such paragraph.

17 (B) A process for the Secretary of State to
18 engage with any ally or partner of the United
19 States regarding technologies which have been
20 incorporated into an unmanned aircraft system
21 produced by Iran, for the purpose of synchro-
22 nizing the export control regime of such ally or
23 partner with the United States export controls
24 developed by the Secretary of Commerce pursu-

1 ant to the strategy under subsection (a) with
2 respect to such technology.

3 (3) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 90 days after
4 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
5 of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
6 committees the strategy under paragraph (1).

7 (4) FORM.—The report required by subsection
8 (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
9 portions of the report described in paragraphs (1)
10 and (2) may contain a classified annex, so long as
11 such annex is provided separately from the unclassified
12 report.

13 (h) REQUIREMENT FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO
14 DEVELOP RANGE OF OPTIONS.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after
16 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
17 of Defense (in coordination with the Secretary of
18 State and the Director of National Intelligence) shall
19 develop a range of options that may be employed by
20 the Armed Forces of the United States to counter
21 or otherwise deny Iran the ability to acquire technologies
22 used, or that may be used, in the design,
23 development, production, or operational employment
24 of unmanned aircraft systems by Iran, including the
25 following technologies:

- 1 (A) Microcontrollers.
- 2 (B) Voltage regulators.
- 3 (C) Digital signal controllers.
- 4 (D) GPS modules.
- 5 (E) Microprocessors.
- 6 (F) Computer Aided Design (CAD) soft-
- 7 ware.
- 8 (G) Computer numerical control machines.

9 (2) BRIEFING.—Not later than 45 days after
10 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
11 of Defense shall provide to the appropriate congres-
12 sional committees a briefing on the options devel-
13 oped under paragraph (1).

14 **SEC. 314. DUTIES ON THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after mak-
16 ing an affirmative determination under section 301, the
17 President shall, notwithstanding any other provision of
18 law, increase the rate of duty for all goods and services
19 imported into the United States from the Russian Federa-
20 tion to a rate of not less 500 percent ad valorem.

21 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after making
22 an affirmative determination under section 301, the Presi-
23 dent shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means
24 of the House of Representatives and the Committee on

1 Finance of the Senate, a report indicating the impact of
 2 these ad valorem tariffs on exports to the United States.

3 **SEC. 315. ENDING RUSSIAN OIL IMPORT LOOPHOLE.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Ending Importation of Rus-
 5 sian Oil Act (Public Law 117–109; 136 Stat. 1154) is
 6 amended—

7 (1) by redesignating section 3 as section 4; and

8 (2) by inserting after section 2 the following:

9 **“SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF ENERGY PROD-**
 10 **UCTS PRODUCED AT REFINERIES OUTSIDE**
 11 **THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

12 “All products classified under chapter 27 of the Har-
 13 monized Tariff Schedule that were produced at any refin-
 14 ery that uses crude oil originating in the Russian Federa-
 15 tion shall be banned from importation into the United
 16 States.”.

17 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 4 of the
 18 Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act (Public Law 117–
 19 109; 136 Stat. 1154), as redesignated by subsection
 20 (a)(1), is amended—

21 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting “or 3” after
 22 “section 2”; and

23 (2) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting “or 3”
 24 after “section 2”.

1 **SEC. 316. TAXING CAPITAL GAINS ON RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN**
2 **ASSETS.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after mak-
4 ing an affirmative determination under section 301, not-
5 withstanding any other provision of law, there is hereby
6 imposed for each taxable year on the disqualified income
7 of any specified foreign government a tax equal to 100
8 percent thereof.

9 (b) WITHHOLDING.—

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 203
11 of the International Emergency Economic Powers
12 Act (or any other provision of law), any person hav-
13 ing control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of
14 disqualified income with respect to which tax is im-
15 posed under subsection (a) shall deduct and withhold
16 from such income a tax equal to 100 percent there-
17 of.

18 (2) APPLICATION OF CERTAIN RULES.—For
19 purposes of subchapter B of chapter 3, section 33,
20 and such other provisions as the Secretary may pro-
21 vide, paragraph (1) shall be treated as part of sub-
22 chapter A of chapter 3.

23 (c) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:

24 (1) DISQUALIFIED INCOME.—The term “dis-
25 qualified income” means any interest or dividends
26 payable with respect to assets which are blocked

1 using the authorities provided by section 203 of the
2 International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

3 (2) SPECIFIED FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.—The
4 term “specified foreign government” means the for-
5 eign governments (within the meaning of section 892
6 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the regu-
7 lations issued thereunder) of Russia and Belarus.

8 (d) OVERRIDE OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS.—Notwith-
9 standing any other provision of law, this section (and the
10 amendments made by this section) shall apply without re-
11 gard to any treaty obligation of the United States.

12 (e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by
13 this section shall apply to interest and dividends received
14 after the date of the enactment of this Act.

15 **SEC. 317. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**

16 The sanctions described in this section are the fol-
17 lowing:

18 (1) PROPERTY BLOCKING.—The President shall
19 exercise all of the powers granted by the Inter-
20 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
21 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block
22 and prohibit all transactions in all property and in-
23 terests in property of the foreign person if such
24 property and interests in property are in the United
25 States, come within the United States, or are or

1 come within the possession or control of a United
2 States person.

3 (2) ALIENS INADMISSIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMIS-
4 SION, OR PAROLE.—

5 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—In
6 the case of an alien, the alien is—

7 (i) inadmissible to the United States;

8 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
9 documentation to enter the United States;
10 and

11 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
12 or paroled into the United States or to re-
13 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-
14 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et
15 seq.).

16 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

17 (i) IN GENERAL.—The visa or other
18 entry documentation of an alien described
19 in subparagraph (A) shall be revoked, re-
20 gardless of when such visa or other entry
21 documentation is or was issued.

22 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-
23 tion under clause (i) shall—

24 (I) take effect immediately; and

1 (II) automatically cancel any
2 other valid visa or entry documenta-
3 tion that is in the alien's possession.

4 (3) LOANS FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
5 INSTITUTIONS.—The President shall direct the
6 United States Executive Director of each inter-
7 national financial institution to use the voice, vote,
8 and influence of the United States to oppose any
9 loan, loan guarantee, or equity investment from the
10 international financial institution that would directly
11 or indirectly benefit the sanctioned foreign person.

12 **SEC. 318. IMPLEMENTATION; REGULATIONS; PENALTIES.**

13 (a) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise
14 all authorities provided to the President under sections
15 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
16 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this
17 title.

18 (b) REGULATIONS.—The President shall issue such
19 regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry
20 out this title.

21 (c) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to
22 violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
23 Act or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out
24 this title shall be subject to the penalties set forth in sub-
25 sections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International

1 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(b) and
2 1705(c)).

3 **SEC. 319. EXCEPTIONS; WAIVER.**

4 (a) EXCEPTIONS.—

5 (1) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTER-
6 NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions described in
7 section 317(2) shall not apply with respect to the
8 admission of an alien if admitting or paroling the
9 alien into the United States is necessary to permit
10 the United States to comply with the Agreement re-
11 garding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
12 signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered
13 into force November 21, 1947, between the United
14 Nations and the United States, or other applicable
15 international obligations.

16 (2) EXCEPTION RELATING TO THE PROVISION
17 OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—Sanctions under
18 this title may not be imposed with respect to trans-
19 actions or the facilitation of transactions for—

20 (A) the sale of agricultural commodities,
21 food, medicine, or medical devices; or

22 (B) the provision of humanitarian assist-
23 ance; or

24 (C) financial transactions relating to hu-
25 manitarian assistance;

1 (3) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE, LAW EN-
2 FORCEMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVI-
3 TIES.—Sanctions under this title shall not apply to
4 any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or na-
5 tional security activities of the United States.

6 (b) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.—The President
7 may waive the imposition of sanctions under this title with
8 respect to a person if the President—

9 (1) determines that such a waiver is in the ex-
10 traordinarily vital to the national security of the
11 United States; and

12 (2) submits to the appropriate committees of
13 Congress a notification of the waiver and the rea-
14 sons for the waiver no less than 15 days before the
15 use of the waiver.

16 **SEC. 320. TERMINATION.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President may terminate the
18 application of sanctions, export controls, duties, prohibi-
19 tions, or penalties under this title if the President certifies
20 to Congress that the Russian Federation has ceased con-
21 ducting a war of aggression against Ukraine or act in vio-
22 lation of a negotiated peace agreement with Ukraine.

23 (b) REIMPOSITION.—The President shall immediately
24 reimpose all previous terminated sanctions, export con-
25 trols, duties, prohibitions, and penalties imposed under

1 this title should the Russian Federation restart a war of
2 aggression against Ukraine or act in violation of a nego-
3 tiated peace agreement with Ukraine.

4 **SEC. 321. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF RUSSIA SANCTIONS.**

5 (a) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF PROPOSED AC-
6 TION.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other
8 provision of law, before taking any action described
9 in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the
10 appropriate congressional committees and leadership
11 a report that describes the proposed action and the
12 reasons for that action.

13 (2) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—

14 (A) IN GENERAL.—An action described in
15 this paragraph is—

16 (i) an action to terminate the applica-
17 tion of any sanction, export control, duty,
18 or prohibition described in subparagraph
19 (B);

20 (ii) with respect to sanctions, export
21 controls, duties, or prohibitions described
22 in subparagraph (B) imposed by the Presi-
23 dent with respect to a person, an action to
24 waive the application of those sanctions
25 with respect to that person; or

1 (iii) a licensing action that signifi-
2 cantly alters United States foreign policy
3 with respect to Russia.

4 (B) SANCTIONS, EXPORT CONTROLS, DU-
5 TIES, AND PROHIBITIONS DESCRIBED.—The
6 sanctions, export controls, duties, and prohibi-
7 tions described in this subparagraph are sanc-
8 tions, export controls, duties, and prohibitions
9 with respect to Russia provided for under—

10 (i) this Act;

11 (ii) Executive Order 13849 (22 U.S.C.
12 9521 note; relating to authorizing the im-
13 plementation of certain sanctions set forth
14 in the Countering America's Adversaries
15 Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et
16 seq.));

17 (iii) Executive Order 13883 (22
18 U.S.C. 5605 note; relating to administra-
19 tion of proliferation sanctions and amend-
20 ment of Executive Order 12851 (22 U.S.C.
21 2797 note; relating to the administration
22 of proliferation sanctions, Middle East
23 arms control, and related congressional re-
24 porting responsibilities));

1 (iv) Executive Order 14024 (50
2 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking
3 property with respect to specified harmful
4 foreign activities of the Government of the
5 Russian Federation);

6 (v) Executive Order 14039 (22 U.S.C.
7 9526 note; relating to blocking property
8 with respect to certain Russian energy ex-
9 port pipelines);

10 (vi) Executive Order 14065 (50
11 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking
12 property of certain persons and prohibiting
13 certain transactions with respect to contin-
14 ued Russian efforts to undermine the sov-
15 ereignty and territorial integrity of
16 Ukraine);

17 (vii) Executive Order 14066 (50
18 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting
19 certain imports and new investments with
20 respect to continued Russian Federation
21 efforts to undermine the sovereignty and
22 territorial integrity of Ukraine);

23 (viii) Executive Order 14068 (50
24 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting
25 certain imports, exports, and new invest-

ment with respect to continued Russian Federation aggression);

(ix) Executive Order 14071 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting new investment in and certain services to the Russian Federation in response to continued Russian Federation aggression); and

(x) Executive Order 14114 (88 Fed. Reg. 89271; relating to taking additional steps with respect to the Russian Federation's harmful activities).

(3) DESCRIPTION OF TYPE OF ACTION.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the action—

(A) is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia; or

(B) is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia.

(4) INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL MATTER.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action

1 that is intended to significantly alter United
2 States foreign policy with respect to Russia
3 shall include a description of—

4 (i) the significant alteration to United
5 States foreign policy with respect to Rus-
6 sia;

7 (ii) the anticipated effect of the action
8 on the national security interests of the
9 United States; and

10 (iii) the policy objectives for which the
11 sanctions affected by the action were ini-
12 tially imposed.

13 (B) REQUESTS FROM BANKING AND FI-
14 NANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEES.—The Com-
15 mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
16 of the Senate or the Committee on Financial
17 Services of the House of Representatives may
18 request the submission to the Committee of the
19 matter described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of sub-
20 paragraph (A) with respect to a report sub-
21 mitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an
22 action that is not intended to significantly alter
23 United States foreign policy with respect to
24 Russia.

1 (5) CONFIDENTIALITY OF PROPRIETARY INFOR-
2 MATION.—Proprietary information that can be asso-
3 ciated with a particular person with respect to an
4 action described in paragraph (2) may be included
5 in a report submitted under paragraph (1) only if
6 the appropriate congressional committees and lead-
7 ership provide assurances of confidentiality, unless
8 that person otherwise consents in writing to such
9 disclosure.

10 (6) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Paragraph
11 (2)(A)(iii) shall not be construed to require the sub-
12 mission of a report under paragraph (1) with respect
13 to the routine issuance of a license that does not sig-
14 nificantly alter United States foreign policy with re-
15 spect to Russia.

16 (b) PERIOD FOR REVIEW BY CONGRESS.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—During the period of 30 cal-
18 endar days beginning on the date on which the
19 President submits a report under subsection
20 (a)(1)—

21 (A) in the case of a report that relates to
22 an action that is not intended to significantly
23 alter United States foreign policy with respect
24 to Russia, the Committee on Banking, Housing,
25 and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Com-

1 mittee on Financial Services of the House of
2 Representatives should, as appropriate, hold
3 hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain in-
4 formation in order to fully review the report;
5 and

6 (B) in the case of a report that relates to
7 an action that is intended to significantly alter
8 United States foreign policy with respect to
9 Russia, the Committee on Foreign Relations of
10 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
11 fairs of the House of Representatives should, as
12 appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and
13 otherwise obtain information in order to fully
14 review the report.

15 (2) EXCEPTION.—The period for congressional
16 review under paragraph (1) of a report required to
17 be submitted under subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 cal-
18 endar days if the report is submitted on or after
19 July 10 and on or before September 7 in any cal-
20 endar year.

21 (3) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING INITIAL
22 CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PERIOD.—Notwithstanding
23 any other provision of law, during the period for
24 congressional review provided for under paragraph
25 (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)

1 proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2),
2 including any additional period for such review as
3 applicable under the exception provided in paragraph
4 (2), the President may not take that action unless
5 a joint resolution of approval with respect to that ac-
6 tion is enacted in accordance with subsection (c).

7 (4) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING PRESI-
8 DENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION
9 OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other pro-
10 vision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval re-
11 lating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)
12 proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2)
13 passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with
14 subsection (c), the President may not take that ac-
15 tion for a period of 12 calendar days after the date
16 of passage of the joint resolution of disapproval.

17 (5) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING CONGRES-
18 SIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION
19 OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other pro-
20 vision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval re-
21 lating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)
22 proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2)
23 passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with
24 subsection (c), and the President vetoes the joint
25 resolution, the President may not take that action

1 for a period of 10 calendar days after the date of
2 the President's veto.

3 (6) EFFECT OF ENACTMENT OF A JOINT RESO-
4 LUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any
5 other provision of law, if a joint resolution of dis-
6 approval relating to a report submitted under sub-
7 section (a)(1) proposing an action described in sub-
8 section (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with sub-
9 section (c), the President may not take that action.

10 (c) JOINT RESOLUTIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OR AP-
11 PROVAL.—

12 (1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

13 (A) JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL.—

14 The term “joint resolution of approval” means
15 only a joint resolution of either House of Con-
16 gress—

17 (i) the title of which is as follows: “A
18 joint resolution approving the President's
19 proposal to take an action relating to the
20 application of certain sanctions with re-
21 spect to Russia.”; and

22 (ii) the sole matter after the resolving
23 clause of which is the following: “Congress
24 approves of the action relating to the appli-
25 cation of sanctions imposed with respect to

1 Russia proposed by the President in the
2 report submitted to Congress under this
3 section of the Ukraine Support Act with
4 the first blank space being filled with the
5 appropriate date and the second blank
6 space being filled with a short description
7 of the proposed action.”.

8 (B) JOINT RESOLUTION OF DIS-
9 APPROVAL.—The term “joint resolution of dis-
10 approval” means only a joint resolution of ei-
11 ther House of Congress—

12 (i) the title of which is as follows: “A
13 joint resolution disapproving the Presi-
14 dent’s proposal to take an action relating
15 to the application of certain sanctions with
16 respect to Russia.”; and

17 (ii) the sole matter after the resolving
18 clause of which is the following: “Congress
19 disapproves of the action relating to the
20 application of sanctions imposed with re-
21 spect to Russia proposed by the President
22 in the report submitted to Congress under
23 this section of the Ukraine Support Act
24 with the first blank space being filled with
25 the appropriate date and the second blank

1 space being filled with a short description
2 of the proposed action.”.

3 (2) INTRODUCTION.—During the period of 30
4 calendar days provided for under subsection (b)(1),
5 including any additional period as applicable under
6 the exception provided in subsection (b)(2), a joint
7 resolution of approval or joint resolution of dis-
8 approval may be introduced—

9 (A) in the House of Representatives, by
10 the majority leader or the minority leader; and

11 (B) in the Senate, by the majority leader
12 (or the majority leader’s designee) or the mi-
13 nority leader (or the minority leader’s des-
14 ignee).

15 (3) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REP-
16 REPRESENTATIVES.—If a committee of the House of
17 Representatives to which a joint resolution of ap-
18 proval or joint resolution of disapproval has been re-
19 ferred has not reported the joint resolution within
20 10 calendar days after the date of referral, that
21 committee shall be discharged from further consider-
22 ation of the joint resolution.

23 (4) CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.—

1 (A) COMMITTEE REFERRAL.—A joint reso-
2 lution of approval or joint resolution of dis-
3 approval introduced in the Senate shall be—

4 (i) referred to the Committee on
5 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
6 the Senate if the joint resolution relates to
7 a report under subsection (a)(3)(A) that
8 relates to an action that is not intended to
9 significantly alter United States foreign
10 policy with respect to Russia; and

11 (ii) referred to the Committee on For-
12 eign Relations of the Senate if the joint
13 resolution relates to a report under sub-
14 section (a)(3)(B) that relates to an action
15 that is intended to significantly alter
16 United States foreign policy with respect
17 to Russia.

18 (B) REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.—If the
19 committee to which a joint resolution of ap-
20 proval or joint resolution of disapproval was re-
21 ferred has not reported the joint resolution
22 within 10 calendar days after the date of refer-
23 ral of the joint resolution, that committee shall
24 be discharged from further consideration of the

1 joint resolution and the joint resolution shall be
2 placed on the appropriate calendar.

3 (C) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—

4 Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing
5 Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time
6 after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
7 Urban Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Re-
8 lations of the Senate, as the case may be, re-
9 ports a joint resolution of approval or joint res-
10 olution of disapproval to the Senate or has been
11 discharged from consideration of such a joint
12 resolution (even though a previous motion to
13 the same effect has been disagreed to) to move
14 to proceed to the consideration of the joint reso-
15 lution, and all points of order against the joint
16 resolution (and against consideration of the
17 joint resolution) are waived. The motion to pro-
18 ceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject
19 to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider
20 the vote by which the motion is agreed to or
21 disagreed to shall not be in order.

22 (D) RULINGS OF THE CHAIR ON PROCE-

23 DURE.—Appeals from the decisions of the Chair
24 relating to the application of the rules of the
25 Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure re-

1 lating to a joint resolution of approval or joint
2 resolution of disapproval shall be decided with-
3 out debate.

4 (E) CONSIDERATION OF VETO MES-
5 SAGES.—Debate in the Senate of any veto mes-
6 sage with respect to a joint resolution of ap-
7 proval or joint resolution of disapproval, includ-
8 ing all debatable motions and appeals in con-
9 nection with the joint resolution, shall be lim-
10 ited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between,
11 and controlled by, the majority leader and the
12 minority leader or their designees.

13 (5) RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE
14 OF REPRESENTATIVES.—

15 (A) TREATMENT OF SENATE JOINT RESO-
16 LUTION IN HOUSE.—In the House of Rep-
17 resentatives, the following procedures shall
18 apply to a joint resolution of approval or a joint
19 resolution of disapproval received from the Sen-
20 ate (unless the House has already passed a
21 joint resolution relating to the same proposed
22 action):

23 (i) The joint resolution shall be re-
24 ferred to the appropriate committees.

1 (ii) If a committee to which a joint
2 resolution has been referred has not re-
3 ported the joint resolution within 2 cal-
4 endar days after the date of referral, that
5 committee shall be discharged from further
6 consideration of the joint resolution.

7 (iii) Beginning on the third legislative
8 day after each committee to which a joint
9 resolution has been referred reports the
10 joint resolution to the House or has been
11 discharged from further consideration
12 thereof, it shall be in order to move to pro-
13 ceed to consider the joint resolution in the
14 House of Representatives. All points of
15 order against the motion are waived. Such
16 a motion shall not be in order after the
17 House of Representatives has disposed of a
18 motion to proceed on the joint resolution.
19 The previous question shall be considered
20 as ordered on the motion to its adoption
21 without intervening motion. The motion
22 shall not be debatable. A motion to recon-
23 sider the vote by which the motion is dis-
24 posed of shall not be in order.

1 (iv) The joint resolution shall be con-
2 sidered as read. All points of order against
3 the joint resolution and against its consid-
4 eration are waived. The previous question
5 shall be considered as ordered on the joint
6 resolution to final passage without inter-
7 vening motion except 2 hours of debate
8 equally divided and controlled by the spon-
9 sor of the joint resolution (or a designee)
10 and an opponent. A motion to reconsider
11 the vote on passage of the joint resolution
12 shall not be in order.

13 (B) TREATMENT OF HOUSE JOINT RESO-
14 LUTION IN SENATE.—

15 (i) RECEIPT BEFORE PASSAGE.—If,
16 before the passage by the Senate of a joint
17 resolution of approval or joint resolution of
18 disapproval, the Senate receives an iden-
19 tical joint resolution from the House of
20 Representatives, the following procedures
21 shall apply:

22 (I) That joint resolution shall not
23 be referred to a committee.

24 (II) With respect to that joint
25 resolution—

1 (aa) the procedure in the
2 Senate shall be the same as if no
3 joint resolution had been received
4 from the House of Representa-
5 tives; but

6 (bb) the vote on passage
7 shall be on the joint resolution
8 from the House of Representa-
9 tives.

10 (ii) RECEIPT AFTER PASSAGE.—If,
11 following passage of a joint resolution of
12 approval or joint resolution of disapproval
13 in the Senate, the Senate receives an iden-
14 tical joint resolution from the House of
15 Representatives, that joint resolution shall
16 be placed on the appropriate Senate cal-
17 endar.

18 (iii) NO COMPANION MEASURE.—If a
19 joint resolution of approval or a joint reso-
20 lution of disapproval is received from the
21 House, and no companion joint resolution
22 has been introduced in the Senate, the
23 Senate procedures under this subsection
24 shall apply to the House joint resolution.

1 (C) APPLICATION TO REVENUE MEAS-
2 URES.—The provisions of this paragraph shall
3 not apply in the House of Representatives to a
4 joint resolution of approval or joint resolution
5 of disapproval that is a revenue measure.

6 (d) TOLLING.—The requirements of this section may
7 not be tolled by either the House of Representatives or
8 the Senate.

9 **SEC. 322. DEFINITIONS.**

10 In this title:

11 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms
12 “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the
13 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
14 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

15 (2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
16 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
17 gress” means—

18 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
19 and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
20 Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

21 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
22 the Committee on Financial Services of the
23 House of Representatives.

24 (3) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “fi-
25 nancial institution” means a financial institution

1 specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E),
2 (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (M), or (Y) of section
3 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code.

4 (4) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The
5 term “foreign financial institution” has the meaning
6 given that term in regulations prescribed by the Sec-
7 retary of the Treasury.

8 (5) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-
9 son” means an individual or entity that is not a
10 United States person.

11 (6) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly” with
12 respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,
13 means that a person had actual knowledge, or
14 should have known, of the conduct, the cir-
15 cumstance, or the result.

16 (7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
17 “United States person” means—

18 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
19 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
20 United States; or

21 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
22 the United States or any jurisdiction within the
23 United States, including a foreign branch of
24 such an entity.

1 (8) WAR OF AGGRESSION.—The term “war of
2 aggression” is implicated when any of the following
3 have occurred in the 30 days prior to a sanctions
4 trigger determination—

5 (A) a ground, amphibious, or airborne as-
6 sault;

7 (B) any naval, aerial, or terrestrial block-
8 ade;

9 (C) any drone or missile attack; and

10 (D) any cyber attack that has any physical
11 repercussion in the sovereign territory of
12 Ukraine.

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