

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2113

To require agencies to use the term “Taiwan” instead of “Chinese Taipei”,
and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 14, 2025

Mr. DONALDS (for himself, Mr. COLLINS, Mr. TIFFANY, and Mr. MOORE of Alabama) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To require agencies to use the term “Taiwan” instead of
“Chinese Taipei”, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “America Supports Tai-
5 wan Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds as follows:

8 (1) The United States Government has never
9 officially recognized the People’s Republic of China’s
10 claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.

1 (2) The People’s Republic of China, led by the
2 Chinese Communist Party, seeks to control Taiwan
3 through means of persuasion and coercion, and po-
4 tentially compellence.

5 (3) The People’s Liberation Army seeks to have
6 the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027, the 100th
7 anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Com-
8 munist Party’s military, the People’s Liberation
9 Army.

10 (4) The People’s Republic of China refers to
11 Taiwan as a “region” and to the President of Tai-
12 wan as “the leader of the Taiwan region”, consistent
13 with its assertion that Taiwan is a region of the
14 People’s Republic of China.

15 (5) Taiwan and mainland China are separated
16 by a “median line” in the Taiwan Strait, which acts
17 as an unofficial boundary that was generally re-
18 spected from 1999, until September 2020, when a
19 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, “there
20 is no so-called median line in the Strait”, and Peo-
21 ple’s Liberation Army aircraft and vessels have re-
22 peatedly crossed the median line since then, as more
23 than 1,400 PRC aircraft reportedly crossed the me-
24 dian line in 2024.

1 (6) An accounting, based on Taiwan Ministry of
2 National Defense reporting, of incursions into Tai-
3 wan’s de facto Air Defense Identification Zone by
4 PRC military aircraft illustrates a sharp increase
5 over time, with approximately 3,075 incursions in
6 2024, up from approximately 390 in 2020, illus-
7 trating a more confrontational posture toward Tai-
8 wan and honing military capabilities required to con-
9 duct combat operations near Taiwan.

10 (7) Many people of Taiwan see the “Chinese
11 Taipei” nomenclature as a symbol of oppression
12 from the People’s Republic of China, originally stem-
13 ming from an effort to find a way for both Taiwan
14 and the People’s Republic of China to participate in
15 the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympics and the
16 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics.

17 (8) In Mandarin Chinese, Taiwan uses a
18 version of “Chinese Taipei” in which “Chinese” is
19 the cultural term “zhonghua” and does not have
20 sovereignty connotations.

21 (9) Comparatively, the Chinese-language trans-
22 lation of “Chinese Taipei” carries the connotation
23 that Taiwan is culturally Chinese, and thus the
24 English term can be easily misunderstood to connote

1 PRC possession of Taipei, and by extension, all of
2 Taiwan.

3 (b) PURPOSE.—It is the sense of Congress that—

4 (1) the United States must stand firm in the
5 commitments it made in the Taiwan Relations Act
6 (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), which declares that it is
7 the policy of the United States to “maintain the ca-
8 pacity of the United States to resist any resort to
9 force or other forms of coercion that would jeop-
10 ardize the security, or the social or economic system,
11 of the people on Taiwan”;

12 (2) the United States Government continues to
13 support Taiwan and enable it to maintain a suffi-
14 cient self-defense capability as it withstands control-
15 seeking persuasion and coercion from an increas-
16 ingly aggressive People’s Republic of China; and

17 (3) the United States Government disfavors the
18 use of the “Chinese Taipei” nomenclature, and in-
19 stead favors the use of “Taiwan” so as to avoid con-
20 notations of possession with the “Chinese Taipei”
21 term in English and support resolution of cross-
22 Strait differences by peaceful means, free from coer-
23 cion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both
24 sides of the Strait.

1 **SEC. 3. AGENCY REQUIREMENT TO USE “TAIWAN”.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The head of an agency may not
3 use “Chinese Taipei” and shall use “Taiwan”, except—

4 (1) in historical context explaining the People’s
5 Republic of China’s attempt to control Taiwan
6 through persuasion and coercion; or

7 (2) to the extent that the head of the agency
8 is working on matters relating to Taiwan with an
9 international organization at which Taiwan is a par-
10 ticipant under a different official name.

11 (b) REQUIREMENT TO UPDATE AGENCY
12 WEBSITES.—Not later than 14 days after the date of the
13 enactment of this Act, the head of each agency shall en-
14 sure the website of the agency meets the requirements of
15 this section.

16 (c) AGENCY DEFINED.—The term “agency” has the
17 meaning given that term in section 551 of title 5, United
18 States Code.

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