

118TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 6453

To require reports on and impose sanctions with respect to Iran’s development of space-launch vehicles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial systems, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 17, 2023

Ms. STEFANIK introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Financial Services, Oversight and Accountability, Ways and Means, Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To require reports on and impose sanctions with respect to Iran’s development of space-launch vehicles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial systems, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023”.

1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
 2 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I—SANCTIONS AND REPORT ON IRANIAN SPACE-LAUNCH
 VEHICLES AND INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

Sec. 101. Findings; sense of Congress.

Sec. 102. Determination and mandatory imposition of sanctions under Execu-
 tive Order 13382.

Sec. 103. Report on support for Iran’s space, aerospace, and ballistic missile
 sectors and United States capacity to deny intercontinental
 ballistic missile attacks from Iran.

Sec. 104. Report on senior officials of Government of Iran responsible for
 space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile tests.

TITLE II—SANCTIONS AND REPORTS RELATING TO IRANIAN
 UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

Sec. 201. Findings; sense of Congress.

Sec. 202. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems and cruise missiles under Com-
 prehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
 of 2010.

Sec. 203. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems in enforcement of arms
 embargos under Countering America’s Adversaries Through
 Sanctions Act.

Sec. 204. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems under Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
 Proliferation Act of 1992.

Sec. 205. Strategy to counter Iranian unmanned aerial systems.

Sec. 206. Report on support for Iran’s unmanned aerial system program and
 related technology transfers.

Sec. 207. Unmanned aerial system defined.

TITLE III—EXPANSION OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996

Sec. 301. Expansion of Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.

3 **TITLE I—SANCTIONS AND RE-**
 4 **PORT ON IRANIAN SPACE-**
 5 **LAUNCH VEHICLES AND**
 6 **INTERCONTINENTAL BAL-**
 7 **LISTIC MISSILES**

8 **SEC. 101. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
 10 ings:

1 (1) The Islamic Republic of Iran has the largest
2 ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, which
3 Iran uses to threaten forces of the United States
4 and partners of the United States in the region.

5 (2) Iran is progressing toward developing an
6 intercontinental ballistic missile (commonly referred
7 to an “ICBM”) capability. In 2023, the Defense In-
8 telligence Agency reported that Iran’s progress on
9 its space-launch vehicles shortens the time needed
10 for Iran to produce an ICBM since space-launch ve-
11 hicles and ICBMs use similar technologies.

12 (3) Iran continues to rely on illicit foreign pro-
13 curement to support its long-range missile aspira-
14 tions. For example, Iran recently tried to purchase
15 from the Russian Federation and the People’s Re-
16 public of China ammonium perchlorate, which is the
17 main ingredient in solid propellants to power mis-
18 siles.

19 (4) Iran relies at least in part on networks in
20 Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China to
21 procure dual-use materials and equipment for its
22 longer-range ballistic missile program.

23 (5) North Korea historically has played a role
24 in supporting longer-range Iranian ballistic missile
25 capabilities. Specifically, North Korea provided the

1 Nodong-A to Iran in the 1990s, which Iran used to
2 develop both its first nuclear-capable medium-range
3 ballistic missile and liquid propellant engines for its
4 space-launch vehicles.

5 (6) While the Iran Space Agency, a government
6 organization subject to sanctions, develops space ca-
7 pabilities for Iran’s ministry of defense as well as
8 the communications sector, Iran’s Revolutionary
9 Guard Corps Aerospace Force (commonly referred to
10 as the “IRGC–AF”) runs a parallel space program
11 employing solid-propellant motors, which if used in
12 ICBM technology, would enable launches with little
13 warning.

14 (7) Iran continues work on larger diameter
15 solid-propellant motors, like the Raza’e, and is now
16 reportedly in the possession of an all-solid-propellant
17 space-launch vehicle called the Qaem–100. The
18 Qaem–100 was reportedly tested twice, once in No-
19 vember 2022 and again in March 2023.

20 (8) The IRGC–AF last successfully launched a
21 satellite into orbit in September 2023 using its
22 Qased rocket, fueled by both liquid- and solid-fueled
23 stages.

24 (9) Iran’s development, production, and trans-
25 fer of space-launch vehicle and ballistic missile tech-

1 nology violated Annex B of United Nations Security
2 Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which enshrined
3 certain restrictions under the Joint Comprehensive
4 Plan of Action. Those restrictions expired on Octo-
5 ber 18, 2023.

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that—

8 (1) Iran’s space program continues to function
9 as a cover for Iran’s quest for an ICBM;

10 (2) the possession by Iran of an ICBM would
11 pose a direct threat to the United States homeland
12 and partners of the United States in Europe; and

13 (3) the United States should work to deny Iran
14 the ability to hold the United States homeland or
15 European partners of the United States at risk with
16 an ICBM.

17 **SEC. 102. DETERMINATION AND MANDATORY IMPOSITION**

18 **OF SANCTIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER**

19 **13382.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall—

22 (1) determine whether each individual or entity
23 specified in subsection (b) meets the criteria for the
24 imposition of sanctions under Executive Order
25 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking

1 property of weapons of mass destruction
2 proliferators and their supporters); and

3 (2) with respect to any such individual or entity
4 the President determines does meet such criteria,
5 impose such sanctions.

6 (b) INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES SPECIFIED.—The
7 individuals and entities specified in this subsection are the
8 following:

9 (1) The Space Division of the IRGC–AF.

10 (2) All senior officers of the IRGC–AF.

11 (3) Brigadier General Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, the
12 commander of the IRGC–AF.

13 (4) General Majid Mousavi, the deputy com-
14 mander of the IRGC–AF.

15 (5) Second Brigadier General Ali-Jafarabadi,
16 the commander of the Space Division of the IRGC–
17 AF.

18 **SEC. 103. REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S SPACE, AERO-**
19 **SPACE, AND BALLISTIC MISSILE SECTORS**
20 **AND UNITED STATES CAPACITY TO DENY**
21 **INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE AT-**
22 **TACKS FROM IRAN.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
24 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
25 fense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury,

1 the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and
2 the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the
3 congressional defense committees a report that includes
4 the following:

5 (1) An identification of entities in Iran not sub-
6 ject to sanctions imposed by the United States as of
7 the date of the report that are helping to support
8 Iran's space, aerospace, and ballistic missile sectors,
9 including public and private entities making a mate-
10 rial contribution to Iran's development of space-
11 launch vehicles or ICBMs.

12 (2) An identification of the countries the gov-
13 ernments of which continue to support Iran's space,
14 aerospace, and ballistic missile activities.

15 (3) With respect to each country identified
16 under paragraph (2), the following:

17 (A) Actions taken by the government of
18 the country or other entities within the country
19 to support Iran's space, aerospace, and ballistic
20 missile activities, including the transfer of mis-
21 siles, engines, propellant or materials that can
22 be used for fuel, or other technologies that
23 could make a material contribution to develop-
24 ment of space-launch vehicles or ICBMs.

1 (B) Any actions described in subparagraph
2 (A) or proposals for such actions being nego-
3 tiated or discussed as of the date of the report.

4 (4) An assessment of Iran's ICBM technology,
5 including the following:

6 (A) Key steps Iran would need to take to
7 develop an ICBM.

8 (B) An assessment of which rocket motors
9 Iran would likely use to build an ICBM.

10 (C) Technological hurdles Iran would still
11 need to overcome to develop an ICBM.

12 (D) Pathways to overcome the hurdles de-
13 scribed in subparagraph (C), including the po-
14 tential transfer of technologies from North
15 Korea, the Russian Federation, or the People's
16 Republic of China.

17 (E) An estimated timeline for Iran to de-
18 velop an ICBM if Iran chooses to do so.

19 (5) An assessment of the missile defense capa-
20 bilities of the United States, as of the date of the
21 report and anticipated for the future, with respect to
22 denying an attack by Iran on the United States
23 homeland, including the following:

24 (A) An assessment of the ability of the
25 Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System, as it

1 exists on the date of the enactment of this Act,
2 to prevent such an attack.

3 (B) An assessment of how the procurement
4 of the Next Generation Interceptor would im-
5 prove the ability of the United States to inter-
6 cept ICBMs launched from Iran.

7 (C) How a third missile defense site on the
8 East Coast of the United States would improve
9 the ability of the United States to intercept
10 ICBMs launched from Iran.

11 (b) UPDATES.—As new information becomes avail-
12 able and not less frequently than annually, the Secretary
13 shall submit to the congressional defense committees an
14 updated version of the report required by subsection (a)
15 that includes updated information under paragraphs (1)
16 through (4) of that subsection.

17 (c) FORM.—Each report submitted under this section
18 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
19 a classified annex.

20 (d) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DE-
21 FINED.—In this section, the term “congressional defense
22 committees” has the meaning given that term in section
23 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

1 **SEC. 104. REPORT ON SENIOR OFFICIALS OF GOVERNMENT**
2 **OF IRAN RESPONSIBLE FOR SPACE-LAUNCH**
3 **VEHICLE OR BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTS.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the
5 date on which the President determines that the Govern-
6 ment of Iran has conducted a test of a space-launch vehi-
7 cle or ballistic missile, the President shall submit to the
8 appropriate congressional committees a notification that
9 identifies each senior official of the Government of Iran
10 that the President determines is responsible for ordering,
11 controlling, or otherwise directing the test.

12 (b) ELEMENTS.—The notification required by sub-
13 section (a) shall include—

14 (1) available information on the ballistic missile
15 or the generic class of ballistic missile or space rock-
16 et that was launched;

17 (2) the trajectory, duration, range, and altitude
18 of the flight of the missile or rocket;

19 (3) the duration, range, and altitude of the
20 flight of each stage of the missile or rocket;

21 (4) the location of the launch point and impact
22 point;

23 (5) the payload; and

24 (6) other technical information that is available.

1 (c) FORM.—The notification required by subsection
2 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may con-
3 tain a classified annex.

4 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
5 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
6 gressional committees” means—

7 (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the
8 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
9 fairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and Se-
10 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

11 (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the
12 Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
13 Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Com-
14 mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
15 tives.

16 **TITLE II—SANCTIONS AND RE-**
17 **PORTS RELATING TO IRA-**
18 **NIAN UNMANNED AERIAL**
19 **SYSTEMS**

20 **SEC. 201. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
22 ings:

23 (1) Iran has a robust unmanned aerial system
24 program under which Iran operates several un-
25 manned aerial systems, including combat drones,

1 drones capable of conducting intelligence, surveil-
2 lance, and reconnaissance, and suicide or kamikaze
3 drones.

4 (2) As of December 2022, Iran reportedly sup-
5 plied more than 1,700 unmanned aerial systems to
6 the Russian Federation, including several hundred of
7 the Shahed–136 suicide drone.

8 (3) Iran and the Russian Federation are report-
9 edly planning to build 6,000 Geran–2 drones, the
10 Russian-made version of the Iranian Shahed–136, at
11 a new facility in the Russian Federation.

12 (4) The Iranian supply of unmanned aerial sys-
13 tems to the Russian Federation has fueled the Rus-
14 sian Federation’s murderous invasion of Ukraine
15 and caused countless civilian deaths.

16 (5) The United States found parts made by
17 more than a dozen United States or western compa-
18 nies in an Iranian unmanned aerial system downed
19 in Ukraine, which are likely transferred to Iran ille-
20 gally.

21 (6) Iran is also responsible for the proliferation
22 of unmanned aerial systems to terrorist groups in
23 the Middle East, including Hamas in Gaza,
24 Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen,
25 which have all employed drones in their murderous

1 attacks on Israel following the October 7, 2023, ter-
2 rorist attacks by Hamas in Israel, which killed more
3 than 1,400 innocent civilians.

4 (7) Iran’s transfer of unmanned aerial systems
5 to other governments and terrorist groups has vio-
6 lated Annex B of United Nations Security Council
7 Resolution 2231 (2015) and restrictions imposed
8 under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
9 which expired on October 18, 2023.

10 (8) Upon the expiration of those restrictions,
11 Iran’s transfer of deadly unmanned aerial systems
12 and ballistic missiles to actors like Hamas and the
13 Russian Federation became legal under international
14 law.

15 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
16 gress that—

17 (1) Iran’s unmanned aerial system program
18 contributes significantly to the instability of the Mid-
19 dle East and threatens the security of the United
20 States and its partners in the Middle East, including
21 Israel;

22 (2) the provision of Iranian unmanned aerial
23 systems gives the Russian Federation an advantage
24 in its war in Ukraine and contributes to the dan-

1 gerous partnership between Iran and the Russian
2 Federation;

3 (3) the expiration of restrictions under the
4 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Annex B of
5 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 on
6 October 18, 2023, helps facilitate Iran’s development
7 and transfer of deadly unmanned aerial systems and
8 ballistic missiles to actors like Hamas and the Rus-
9 sian Federation; and

10 (4) the United States should seek to hinder
11 Iran’s unmanned aerial system production, its trans-
12 fer of such systems to the Russian Federation,
13 Hamas, and other hostile state and non-state actors,
14 and to prevent the further use of United States com-
15 ponents in Iranian unmanned aerial systems.

16 **SEC. 202. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS AND**
17 **CRUISE MISSILES UNDER COMPREHENSIVE**
18 **IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DI-**
19 **VESTMENT ACT OF 2010.**

20 (a) FINDINGS.—Section 2(1) of the Comprehensive
21 Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of
22 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501(1)) is amended by striking “and
23 ballistic missiles” and inserting “, ballistic missiles, and
24 unmanned aerial systems and cruise missiles”.

1 (b) INCLUSION IN GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECH-
2 NOLOGIES OF DIVERSION CONCERN.—Section
3 302(b)(1)(B) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Ac-
4 countability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
5 8542(b)(1)(B)) is amended—

6 (1) in clause (ii), by striking “; or” and insert-
7 ing a semicolon;

8 (2) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv);
9 and

10 (3) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:

11 “(iii) unmanned aerial system (as de-
12 fined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or
13 Drones for Iran Act of 2023) or cruise
14 missile program; or”.

15 (c) SUNSET.—Section 401(a)(2) of the Comprehen-
16 sive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
17 of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)(2)) is amended by striking
18 “and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch tech-
19 nology” and inserting “, ballistic missiles and ballistic mis-
20 sile launch technology, and unmanned aerial system (as
21 defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for
22 Iran Act of 2023) and cruise missile programs.”.

1 **SEC. 203. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS IN**
2 **ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS EMBARGOS UNDER**
3 **COUNTERING AMERICA'S ADVERSARIES**
4 **THROUGH SANCTIONS ACT.**

5 Section 107(a)(1) of the Countering America's Ad-
6 versaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9406(a)(1))
7 is amended by inserting "unmanned aerial systems (as de-
8 fined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran
9 Act of 2023)," after "warships,".

10 **SEC. 204. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS**
11 **UNDER IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERA-**
12 **TION ACT OF 1992.**

13 Section 1608(1) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Pro-
14 liferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C.
15 1701 note) is amended by inserting "unmanned aerial sys-
16 tems (as defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or
17 Drones for Iran Act of 2023)," after "cruise missiles,".

18 **SEC. 205. STRATEGY TO COUNTER IRANIAN UNMANNED**
19 **AERIAL SYSTEMS.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
22 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
23 (with a classified annex) that includes a strategy for coun-
24 tering Iran's growing unmanned aerial systems program
25 and its transfer of unmanned aerial systems and related
26 technology to foreign states and non-state actors.

1 (b) PLAN TO PREVENT IRAN OBTAINING UNITED
2 STATES MATERIALS.—

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—The strategy required by
4 subsection (a) shall draw upon the work of the
5 President Biden’s interagency task force inves-
6 tigating the presence of United States parts in Ira-
7 nian unmanned aerial systems to develop a plan for
8 preventing Iran from obtaining United States mate-
9 rials for its unmanned aerial system program.

10 (2) ELEMENTS.—The plan required by para-
11 graph (1) shall include the following:

12 (A) A list of identified United States com-
13 ponents found in Iranian unmanned aerial sys-
14 tems and a list of United States suppliers of
15 those components.

16 (B) An assessment of existing export con-
17 trols for components described in subparagraph
18 (A) and a plan to strengthen those export con-
19 trols, including through any necessary legisla-
20 tive action by Congress.

21 (C) An investigation into and identification
22 of foreign actors, including individuals and gov-
23 ernment and nongovernmental entities, that are
24 supplying components to the Iranian unmanned
25 aerial system and weapons programs.

1 (D) Strategies to deny supply chains for
2 such components, including any sanctions or
3 other actions to target the individuals or enti-
4 ties identified under subparagraph (C).

5 (E) An identification of any additional au-
6 thorities or funding needed to enable the inves-
7 tigation of how Iran is obtaining United States
8 components for its unmanned aerial system pro-
9 gram.

10 (F) An assessment of how the Bureau of
11 Industry and Security of the Department of
12 Commerce is monitoring compliance with their
13 restrictions on Iranian unmanned aerial system
14 producers aimed at ensuring United States and
15 other foreign-made components are not being
16 used in Iranian unmanned aerial systems.

17 (G) An investigation into Iran's use of
18 shell companies to evade sanctions and restric-
19 tions on the use of United States or other for-
20 eign-made components in Iranian unmanned
21 aerial system production.

22 (H) Strategies to ensure United States
23 manufacturers of critical components for un-
24 manned aerial systems can verify the end users
25 of those components.

1 (I) Any other actions that could be use to
2 disrupt Iran’s unmanned aerial system and
3 weapons programs and its transfers to foreign
4 states and non-state actors.

5 (c) DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.—The strategy required
6 by subsection (a) shall include a diplomatic strategy to co-
7 ordinate with allies of the United States to counter Iran’s
8 unmanned aerial system production and transfer of un-
9 manned aerial systems and related technologies to foreign
10 states and non-state actors, including the following:

11 (1) Coordination with respect to sanctions com-
12 parable to the sanctions the United States is re-
13 quired to apply under the amendments made by this
14 title.

15 (2) Intelligence sharing with allies of the United
16 States to determine how Iran is obtaining western
17 components for its unmanned aerial system pro-
18 gram.

19 (3) Intelligence sharing with allies of the United
20 States to track, monitor, and disrupt Iranian trans-
21 fers of its unmanned aerial system technology to for-
22 eign states and non-state actors.

23 (4) A plan to cooperate with allies of the United
24 States to develop or advance anti-unmanned aerial
25 system equipment.

1 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
2 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
3 gressional committees” means—

4 (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the
5 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
6 fairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and Se-
7 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

8 (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the
9 Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
10 Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Com-
11 mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
12 tives.

13 **SEC. 206. REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR IRAN’S UNMANNED**
14 **AERIAL SYSTEM PROGRAM AND RELATED**
15 **TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
17 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
18 fense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Di-
19 rector of National Intelligence, the Secretary of the Treas-
20 ury, and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the
21 congressional defense committees a report that outlines
22 the following:

23 (1) Domestic industries, individuals, or entities
24 in Iran not subject to sanctions imposed by the
25 United States as of the date of the report that are

1 helping to support Iran’s unmanned aerial system
2 program, including both public and private entities
3 making a material contribution to Iran’s production
4 of unmanned aerial systems.

5 (2) A list of foreign states or non-state actors
6 using Iranian unmanned aerial system technology or
7 looking to purchase it, including any negotiations or
8 discussions ongoing as of the date of the enactment
9 of this Act between Iran and a foreign state or non-
10 state actor to acquire such technology from Iran.

11 (3) An assessment of cooperation between Iran
12 and the People’s Republic of China to develop,
13 produce, acquire, or export unmanned aerial system
14 technology.

15 (4) An assessment of cooperation between Iran
16 and the Russian Federation to develop, produce, ac-
17 quire, or export unmanned aerial system technology,
18 including a status update on Russian capabilities to
19 produce Iranian unmanned aerial systems.

20 (5) An assessment on how the October 18,
21 2023, expiration of sanctions and other restrictions
22 under Annex B of United Nations Security Council
23 Resolution 2231 (2015) have or have not increased
24 cooperation between Iran and the Russian Federa-
25 tion or Iran and the People’s Republic of China re-

1 lating to transactions previously restricted under
2 that resolution.

3 (b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
4 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
5 a classified annex.

6 (c) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DE-
7 FINED.—In this section, the term “congressional defense
8 committees” has the meaning given that term in section
9 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

10 **SEC. 207. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM DEFINED.**

11 In this title, the term “unmanned aerial system”—

12 (1) means an aircraft without a human pilot
13 onboard that is controlled by an operator remotely
14 or programmed to fly autonomously; and

15 (2) includes—

16 (A) unmanned vehicles that conduct intel-
17 ligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance oper-
18 ations;

19 (B) unmanned vehicles that can loiter,
20 such as suicide or kamikaze drones; and

21 (C) unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

1 **TITLE III—EXPANSION OF IRAN**
2 **SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996**

3 **SEC. 301. EXPANSION OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.**

4 (a) EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
5 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND CONVENTIONAL
6 WEAPONS.—Section 5(b)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of
7 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
8 amended—

9 (1) in the paragraph heading, by striking “EX-
10 PORTS, TRANSFERS, AND TRANSSHIPMENTS” and in-
11 serting “WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND
12 CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS”;

13 (2) in subparagraph (A), by striking “the Iran
14 Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
15 2012” and inserting “the No ICBMs or Drones for
16 Iran Act of 2023”;

17 (3) in subparagraph (B)—

18 (A) in clause (i), by striking “would likely”
19 and inserting “may”;

20 (B) in clause (ii)—

21 (i) in subclause (I)—

22 (I) by striking “or develop” and
23 inserting “develop, or export”; and

24 (II) by striking “; or” and insert-
25 ing a semicolon;

1 (ii) by redesignating subclause (II) as
2 subclause (IV); and

3 (iii) by inserting after subclause (I)
4 the following:

5 “(II) acquire or develop ballistic
6 missiles or ballistic missile launch
7 technologies;

8 “(III) acquire or develop un-
9 manned aerial systems (as defined in
10 section 207 of the No ICBMs or
11 Drones for Iran Act of 2023); or”.

12 (b) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SPACE-LAUNCH
13 AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS.—Section 5(b) of the
14 Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50
15 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the
16 following:

17 “(4) SPACE-LAUNCH AND BALLISTIC MISSILE
18 GOODS, SERVICES, OR TECHNOLOGY.—

19 “(A) TRANSFER TO IRAN.—Except as pro-
20 vided in subsection (f), the President shall im-
21 pose 5 or more of the sanctions described in
22 section 6(a) with respect to a person if the
23 President determines that the person, on or
24 after the date of the enactment of the No
25 ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023, know-

1 ingly exports, transfers, or permits or otherwise
2 facilitates the transshipment or reexport of
3 goods, services, technology, or other items to
4 Iran that may support Iran’s efforts to acquire,
5 develop, or export its space-launch programs,
6 space-launch vehicles, or ballistic missiles or
7 ballistic missile launch technologies.

8 “(B) DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT FOR
9 DEVELOPMENT.—Except as provided in sub-
10 section (f), the President shall impose 5 or
11 more of the sanctions described in section 6(a)
12 with respect to—

13 “(i) an agency or instrumentality of
14 the Government of Iran if the President
15 determines that the agency or instrumen-
16 tality knowingly, on or after the date of
17 the enactment of the No ICBMs or Drones
18 for Iran Act of 2023, seeks to develop, pro-
19 cure, or acquire goods, services, or tech-
20 nology that may support efforts by the
21 Government of Iran with respect to space-
22 launch vehicle or ballistic missile-related
23 goods, services, and items listed on the
24 Equipment, Software, and Technology
25 Annex of the Missile Technology Control

1 Regime (commonly referred to as the
2 ‘MTCR Annex’);

3 “(ii) a foreign person or an agency or
4 instrumentality of a foreign state (as de-
5 fined in section 1603(b) of title 28, United
6 States Code) if the President determines
7 that the person or agency or instrumen-
8 tality knowingly, on or after such date of
9 enactment, provides material support to
10 the Government of Iran that may support
11 efforts by the Government of Iran with re-
12 spect to space-launch vehicle or ballistic
13 missile-related goods, services, and items
14 listed on the MTCR Annex; and

15 “(iii) a foreign person that the Presi-
16 dent determines knowingly, on or after
17 such date of enactment, engages in a
18 transaction or transactions with, or pro-
19 vides financial services for, a foreign per-
20 son or an agency or instrumentality of a
21 foreign state described in clause (i) or (ii)
22 with respect to space-launch vehicle or bal-
23 listic missile-related goods, services, and
24 items listed on the MTCR Annex.

1 “(C) CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS.—Not
2 later than 30 days after receiving a request
3 from the chairman or ranking member of the
4 appropriate congressional committees with re-
5 spect to whether a person meets the criteria for
6 the imposition of sanctions under subparagraph
7 (A) or (B), the President shall—

8 “(i) determine if the person meets
9 such criteria; and

10 “(ii) submit a report to the chairman
11 or ranking member, as the case may be,
12 who submitted the request with respect to
13 that determination that includes a state-
14 ment of whether or not the President im-
15 posed or intends to impose sanctions with
16 respect to the person.”.

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