

117TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# S. 4554

To establish a task force to monitor the nuclear weapons and missile capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 19, 2022

Mr. GRAHAM (for himself and Mr. MENENDEZ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To establish a task force to monitor the nuclear weapons and missile capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Iran Nuclear Weapons  
5 Capability Monitoring Act of 2022”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) In the late 1980s, the Islamic Republic of  
9 Iran established the AMAD Project with the intent

1 to manufacture 5 nuclear weapons and prepare an  
2 underground nuclear test site.

3 (2) Since at least 2002, the Islamic Republic of  
4 Iran has advanced its nuclear and ballistic missile  
5 programs, posing serious threats to the security in-  
6 terests of the United States, Israel, and other allies  
7 and partners.

8 (3) In 2002, nuclear facilities in Natanz and  
9 Arak, Iran, were revealed to the public by the Na-  
10 tional Council of Resistance of Iran.

11 (4) On April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of  
12 Iran announced that it had enriched uranium for the  
13 first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at the  
14 Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz, Iran.

15 (5) On December 23, 2006, the United Nations  
16 Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006),  
17 which imposed sanctions with respect to the Islamic  
18 Republic of Iran for its failure to suspend enrich-  
19 ment activities.

20 (6) The United Nations Security Council subse-  
21 quently adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803  
22 (2008), and 1929 (2010), all of which targeted the  
23 nuclear program of and imposed additional sanctions  
24 with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

1           (7) On February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic  
2 of Iran announced that it had launched its first sat-  
3 ellite, which raised concern over the applicability of  
4 the satellite to the ballistic missile program.

5           (8) In September 2009, the United States, the  
6 United Kingdom, and France revealed the existence  
7 of the clandestine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in  
8 Iran, years after construction started on the plant.

9           (9) In 2010, the Islamic Republic of Iran re-  
10 portedly had enriched uranium to a level of 20 per-  
11 cent.

12           (10) On March 9, 2016, the Islamic Republic of  
13 Iran launched 2 variations of the Qadr medium-  
14 range ballistic missile.

15           (11) On January 28, 2017, the Islamic Repub-  
16 lic of Iran conducted a test of a medium-range bal-  
17 listic missile, which traveled an estimated 600 miles  
18 and provides the Islamic Republic of Iran the capa-  
19 bility to threaten military installations of the United  
20 States in the Middle East.

21           (12) In 2018, Israel seized a significant portion  
22 of the nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of  
23 Iran, which contained tens of thousands of files and  
24 compact discs relating to past efforts at nuclear  
25 weapon design, development, and manufacturing by

1 the Islamic Republic of Iran, including such efforts  
2 occurring after 2003.

3 (13) On September 27, 2018, Israel revealed  
4 the existence of a secret warehouse housing radio-  
5 active material in the Turquz Abad district in  
6 Tehran, and an inspection of the warehouse by the  
7 International Atomic Energy Agency detected radio-  
8 active particles, which the Government of the Is-  
9 lamic Republic of Iran failed to adequately explain.

10 (14) On June 19, 2020, the International  
11 Atomic Energy Agency adopted Resolution GOV/  
12 2020/34 expressing “serious concern . . . that Iran  
13 has not provided access to the Agency under the Ad-  
14 ditional Protocol to two locations”.

15 (15) On January 8, 2020, an Iranian missile  
16 struck an Iraqi military base where members of the  
17 United States Armed Forces were stationed, result-  
18 ing in 11 of such members being treated for injuries.

19 (16) On April 17, 2021, the International  
20 Atomic Energy Agency verified that the Islamic Re-  
21 public of Iran had begun to enrich uranium to 60  
22 percent purity.

23 (17) On August 14, 2021, President of Iran  
24 Hassan Rouhani stated that “Iran’s Atomic Energy  
25 Organization can enrich uranium by 20 percent and

1       60 percent and if one day our reactors need it, it  
2       can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity”.

3           (18) According to the International Institute  
4       for Strategic Studies, the Islamic Republic of Iran  
5       has “between six and eight liquid-fuel ballistic mis-  
6       siles and up to 12 solid-fuel systems” as of 2021.

7           (19) On November 9, 2021, the Islamic Repub-  
8       lic of Iran completed Zolfaghar-1400, a 3-day war  
9       game that included conventional navy, army, air  
10      force, and air defense forces testing cruise missiles,  
11      torpedoes, and suicide drones in the Strait of  
12      Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea, and the  
13      Indian Ocean.

14          (20) On December 20, 2021, the Islamic Re-  
15      public of Iran commenced a 5-day drill in which it  
16      launched a number of short- and long-range ballistic  
17      missiles that it claimed could destroy Israel, consti-  
18      tuting an escalation in the already genocidal rhetoric  
19      of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward Israel.

20          (21) On January 24, 2022, Houthi rebels,  
21      backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, fired 2 mis-  
22      siles at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab  
23      Emirates, which hosts around 2,000 members of the  
24      Armed Forces of the United States.

1           (22) On January 31, 2022, surface-to-air inter-  
2           ceptors of the United Arab Emirates shot down a  
3           Houthi missile fired at the United Arab Emirates  
4           during a visit by President of Israel Isaac Herzog,  
5           the first-ever visit of an Israeli President to the  
6           United Arab Emirates.

7           (23) On February 9, 2022, the Islamic Repub-  
8           lic of Iran unveiled a new surface-to-surface missile,  
9           named “Kheibar Shekan”, which has a reported  
10          range of 900 miles (1450 kilometers) and is capable  
11          of penetrating missile shields.

12          (24) On March 13, 2022, the Islamic Republic  
13          of Iran launched 12 missiles into Erbil, Iraq, which  
14          struck near a consulate building of the United  
15          States.

16          (25) On April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of  
17          Iran confirmed the relocation of a production facility  
18          for advanced centrifuges from an aboveground facil-  
19          ity at Karaj, Iran, to the fortified underground  
20          Natanz Enrichment Complex.

21          (26) On April 19, 2022, the Department of  
22          State released a report stating that there are “seri-  
23          ous concerns” about “possible undeclared nuclear  
24          material and activities in Iran”.

1           (27) On May 30, 2022, the International Atom-  
2           ic Energy Agency reported that the Islamic Republic  
3           of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms,  
4           equivalent to 95.5 pounds, of 60 percent highly en-  
5           riched uranium, roughly enough material for a nu-  
6           clear weapon.

7           (28) On June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of  
8           Iran turned off surveillance cameras installed by the  
9           International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor ura-  
10          nium enrichment activities at nuclear sites in the  
11          country.

12 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

13          It is the sense of Congress that—

14                (1) the Department of State has used evidence  
15                of the intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ad-  
16                vance a nuclear program to secure the support of  
17                the international community in passing and imple-  
18                menting United Nations Security Council Resolu-  
19                tions on the Islamic Republic of Iran;

20                (2) intelligence agencies have compiled evidence  
21                of the intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ad-  
22                vance a nuclear program, with direct evidence of an  
23                active nuclear weapons program prior to 2003;

24                (3) an Islamic Republic of Iran that possesses  
25                a nuclear weapons capability would be a serious

1 threat to the national security of the United States,  
2 Israel, and other allies and partners;

3 (4) the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less  
4 than cooperative with international inspectors from  
5 the International Atomic Energy Agency and has ob-  
6 structed their ability to inspect numerous nuclear fa-  
7 cilities across Iran;

8 (5) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to  
9 advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs,  
10 which are a threat to the national security of the  
11 United States, Israel, and other allies and partners;  
12 and

13 (6) all possible action should be taken by the  
14 United States—

15 (A) to ensure that the Islamic Republic of  
16 Iran does not develop a nuclear weapons capa-  
17 bility; and

18 (B) to protect against aggression from the  
19 Islamic Republic of Iran manifested in its mis-  
20 siles program.

21 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

22 In this Act:

23 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
24 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
25 mittees” means—



1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,  
2 the Committee on Appropriations, the Com-  
3 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on  
4 Energy and Natural Resources, and the Select  
5 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

6 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the  
7 Committee on Appropriations, the Committee  
8 on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy  
9 and Commerce, and the Permanent Select Com-  
10 mittee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-  
11 resentatives.

12 (2) COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREE-  
13 MENT.—The term “Comprehensive Safeguards  
14 Agreement” means the Agreement between the Is-  
15 lamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic  
16 Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in  
17 Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  
18 of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973.

19 (3) TASK FORCE.—The term “task force”  
20 means the task force established under section 5.

21 (4) UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM.—The term  
22 “unmanned aircraft system” has the meaning given  
23 the term in section 44801 of title 49, United States  
24 Code.

1 **SEC. 5. ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE**  
2 **ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITY IN THE ISLAMIC RE-**  
3 **PUBLIC OF IRAN.**

4 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall  
5 establish a task force to consolidate and synthesize efforts  
6 by the United States Government to monitor and assess  
7 nuclear weapons activity being carried out by the Islamic  
8 Republic of Iran or its proxies.

9 (b) COMPOSITION.—

10 (1) CHAIRPERSON.—The Secretary of State  
11 shall be the Chairperson of the task force.

12 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—The task force shall be  
14 composed of individuals, each of whom shall be  
15 an employee of and appointed to the task force  
16 by the head of one of the following agencies:

17 (i) The Department of State.

18 (ii) The Office of the Director of Na-  
19 tional Intelligence.

20 (iii) The Department of Defense.

21 (iv) The Department of Energy.

22 (v) The Central Intelligence Agency.

23 (B) ADDITIONAL MEMBERS.—The Chair-  
24 person may appoint to the task force additional  
25 individuals from other Federal agencies, as the  
26 Chairperson considers necessary.

1 **SEC. 6. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.**

2 (a) REPORT ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITY.—

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days  
4 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and  
5 every 120 days thereafter until December 31, 2028,  
6 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the task  
7 force, shall submit to the appropriate congressional  
8 committees a report on nuclear activity in the Is-  
9 lamic Republic of Iran.

10 (2) CONTENTS.—The report required by para-  
11 graph (1) shall include—

12 (A) a description and location of current  
13 fuel cycle activities for the production of fissile  
14 material being undertaken by the Islamic Re-  
15 public of Iran, including—

16 (i) research and development activities  
17 to procure or construct additional ad-  
18 vanced IR-2, IR-6, and other model cen-  
19 trifuges and enrichment cascades, includ-  
20 ing for stable isotopes;

21 (ii) research and development of re-  
22 processing capabilities, including—

23 (I) reprocessing of spent fuel;  
24 and

1 (II) extraction of medical iso-  
2 topes from irradiated uranium tar-  
3 gets;

4 (iii) activities with respect to design-  
5 ing or constructing reactors, including—

6 (I) the construction of heavy  
7 water reactors;

8 (II) the manufacture or procure-  
9 ment of reactor components, including  
10 the intended application of such com-  
11 ponents; and

12 (III) efforts to rebuild the origi-  
13 nal reactor at Arak;

14 (iv) uranium mining, concentration,  
15 conversion, and fuel fabrication, includ-  
16 ing—

17 (I) estimated uranium ore pro-  
18 duction capacity and annual recovery;

19 (II) recovery processes and ore  
20 concentrate production capacity and  
21 annual recovery;

22 (III) research and development  
23 with respect to, and the annual rate  
24 of, conversion of uranium; and

1 (IV) research and development  
2 with respect to the fabrication of reac-  
3 tor fuels, including the use of de-  
4 pleted, natural, and enriched uranium;  
5 and

6 (v) activities with respect to—

7 (I) producing or acquiring pluto-  
8 nium or uranium (or their alloys);

9 (II) conducting research and de-  
10 velopment on plutonium or uranium  
11 (or their alloys);

12 (III) uranium metal; or

13 (IV) casting, forming, or machin-  
14 ing plutonium or uranium;

15 (B) with respect to any activity described  
16 in subparagraph (A), a description, as applica-  
17 ble, of—

18 (i) the number and type of centrifuges  
19 used to enrich uranium and the operating  
20 status of such centrifuges;

21 (ii) the number and location of any  
22 enrichment or associated research and de-  
23 velopment facility used to engage in such  
24 activity;

1 (iii) the amount of heavy water, in  
2 metric tons, produced by such activity and  
3 the acquisition or manufacture of major  
4 reactor components, including, for the sec-  
5 ond and subsequent reports, the amount  
6 produced since the last report;

7 (iv) the number and type of fuel as-  
8 semblies produced by the Islamic Republic  
9 of Iran, including failed or rejected assem-  
10 blies; and

11 (v) the total amount of—

12 (I) uranium-235 enriched to not  
13 greater than 5 percent purity;

14 (II) uranium-235 enriched to  
15 greater than 5 percent purity and not  
16 greater than 20 percent purity;

17 (III) uranium-235 enriched to  
18 greater than 20 percent purity and  
19 not greater than 60 percent purity;

20 (IV) uranium-235 enriched to  
21 greater than 60 percent purity and  
22 not greater than 90 percent purity;  
23 and

24 (V) uranium-235 enriched great-  
25 er than 90 percent purity;

1 (C) a description of weaponization plans  
2 and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran,  
3 including—

4 (i) plans and capabilities with respect  
5 to—

6 (I) weapon design, including fis-  
7 sion, warhead miniaturization, and  
8 boosted and early thermonuclear  
9 weapon design;

10 (II) high-yield fission develop-  
11 ment;

12 (III) design, development, acqui-  
13 sition, or use of computer models to  
14 simulate nuclear explosive devices;  
15 and

16 (IV) design, development, fabri-  
17 cating, acquisition, or use of explo-  
18 sively driven neutron sources or spe-  
19 cialized materials for explosively driv-  
20 en neutron sources;

21 (ii) the ability of the Islamic Republic  
22 of Iran to deploy a working or reliable de-  
23 livery vehicle capable of carrying a nuclear  
24 warhead;

1 (iii) the estimated breakout time for  
2 the Islamic Republic of Iran to develop and  
3 deploy a nuclear weapon, including a crude  
4 nuclear weapon;

5 (iv) the status and location of any re-  
6 search and development work site related  
7 to the preparation of an underground nu-  
8 clear test; and

9 (v) any dual-use item (as defined  
10 under section 730.3 of title 15, Code of  
11 Federal Regulations or listed on the List  
12 of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment,  
13 Materials, Software, and Related Tech-  
14 nology issued by the Nuclear Suppliers  
15 Group or any successor list) the Islamic  
16 Republic of Iran is using to further the nu-  
17 clear weapon or missile program;

18 (D) an identification of clandestine nuclear  
19 facilities, including nuclear facilities and activi-  
20 ties discovered or reported by Israel or other al-  
21 lies or partners of the United States;

22 (E) an assessment of whether the Islamic  
23 Republic of Iran—

24 (i) is in compliance with the Com-  
25 prehensive Safeguards Agreement and



1 modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Ar-  
2 rangements to the Comprehensive Safe-  
3 guards Agreement; and

4 (ii) has denied access to sites that the  
5 International Atomic Energy Agency has  
6 sought to inspect during the period covered  
7 by the report;

8 (F) any diversion by the Islamic Republic  
9 of Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or other mate-  
10 rials for use in an undeclared or clandestine fa-  
11 cility;

12 (G) an assessment of activities related to  
13 nuclear weapons conducted at facilities con-  
14 trolled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed  
15 Forces Logistics of Iran, the Islamic Revolu-  
16 tionary Guard Corps, and the Organization of  
17 Defensive Innovation and Research, including  
18 an analysis of gaps in knowledge due to the  
19 lack of inspections and nontransparency of such  
20 facilities;

21 (H) a description of activities between the  
22 Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries,  
23 including the Democratic People's Republic of  
24 Korea, or persons with respect to sharing infor-

1 mation on nuclear weapons or activities related  
2 to weaponization;

3 (I) with respect to any new ballistic, cruise,  
4 or hypersonic missiles being designed and tested  
5 by the Islamic Republic of Iran or any of its  
6 proxies, a description of—

7 (i) the type of missile;

8 (ii) the range of such missiles;

9 (iii) the capability of such missiles to  
10 deliver a nuclear warhead;

11 (iv) the number of such missiles; and

12 (v) any testing of such missiles;

13 (J) an assessment of whether the Islamic  
14 Republic of Iran or any of its proxies possesses  
15 an unmanned aircraft system or other military  
16 equipment capable of delivering a nuclear weap-  
17 on;

18 (K) an assessment of whether the Islamic  
19 Republic of Iran or any of its proxies has en-  
20 gaged in new or evolving nuclear weapons devel-  
21 opment activities that would pose a threat to  
22 the national security of the United States,  
23 Israel, or other partners or allies; and

24 (L) any other information that the task  
25 force determines is necessary to ensure a com-

1           plete understanding of the nuclear or other  
2           weapons activities of the Islamic Republic of  
3           Iran.

4           (3) FORM; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—

5                   (A) FORM.—Each report required by para-  
6                   graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified  
7                   form but may include a classified annex for in-  
8                   formation that, if released, would be detri-  
9                   mental to the national security of the United  
10                  States.

11                   (B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassi-  
12                   fied portion of a report required by paragraph  
13                   (1) shall be made available to the public on an  
14                   internet website of the Department of State.

15           (b) IMMEDIATE REPORT REQUIRED.—If the task  
16           force receives credible intelligence of a significant develop-  
17           ment in the nuclear weapons capabilities or delivery sys-  
18           tems capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which  
19           if not reported before the delivery of the next report under  
20           subsection (a)(1) would be detrimental to the national se-  
21           curity of the United States, Israel, or other allies or part-  
22           ners, the task force shall, within 72 hours of the receipt  
23           of such intelligence, submit to the appropriate congres-  
24           sional committees a report on such development.

1 **SEC. 7. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO ADDRESS IDENTIFIED**  
2 **NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS**  
3 **TO THE UNITED STATES.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the  
5 submission of the initial report under section 6(a), and  
6 annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit  
7 to the appropriate congressional committees a diplomatic  
8 strategy that outlines a comprehensive plan for engaging  
9 with partners and allies of the United States regarding  
10 the nuclear weapons and missile activities of the Islamic  
11 Republic of Iran.

12 (b) CONTENTS.—The diplomatic strategy required by  
13 subsection (a) shall include—

14 (1) a description of efforts of the United States  
15 to counter efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran to  
16 project political and military influence into the Mid-  
17 dle East;

18 (2) a response by the Secretary of State to the  
19 increased threat that new or evolving nuclear weap-  
20 ons or missile development activities by the Islamic  
21 Republic of Iran pose to United States citizens and  
22 the diplomatic presence of the United States in the  
23 Middle East;

24 (3) a description of a coordinated whole-of-gov-  
25 ernment approach to use political, economic, and se-  
26 curity related tools to address such activities; and

1           (4) a comprehensive plan for engaging with al-  
2           lies and regional partners in all relevant multilateral  
3           fora to address such activities.

4           (c) UPDATED STRATEGY RELATED TO IMMEDIATE  
5           REPORTS.—Not later than 15 days after the submission  
6           of report under section 6(b), the Secretary of State shall  
7           submit to the appropriate congressional committees an up-  
8           date to the most recent diplomatic strategy submitted  
9           under subsection (a).

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